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From Scanning to Sexting: The Scope of
Protection of Dignity-Based Privacy in
Canadian Child Pornography Law
ANDREA SLANE*
The Canadian approach to privacy rights in one's body is embedded in the relationship
between interests in privacy, bodily integrity, and human dignity. Clarifying these interests
is complicated by Canada's middle-ground stance between the European "dignity-based"
approach to privacy and the US "liberty-based" orientation. The Canadian approach is closer
to the European model when intrusions upon the body are conceived as wholly or mostly
non-consensual (e.g., strip searches, voyeurism, and most child pornography). However, once
consent plays a potentially determinative rote, the US liberty-based approach gains ground.
This reluctance to fully align dignity with privacy results in confusion about the scope of ongoing
privacy interests in nude images, as evidenced by recent debates about the use of airport body
scanners and the appropriate response to adolescent "sexting." The author argues that a
clearer alignment with a dignity-based approach emerging in Canadian child pornography
jurisprudence would better address the harms caused by misuse of photography, as appli-
cable to both children and adults.
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THE NATURE AND SCOPE of legally enforceable privacy rights are notoriously
vague, and yet the concept of privacy continues to play a central role in judicial
reasoning concerning a person's right to control his or her own body.' In Cana-
dian jurisprudence, the vague contours of privacy rights manifest themselves in
frequent references to interrelated interests in "privacy, bodily integrity, and hu-
man dignity,"' which have developed over the last decade in two body-centered
contexts. The first is protection against unreasonable bodily searches, as per section
8 of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms,3 and the second pertains to child
pornography offences. In both contexts, clarifying the differences between privacy,
bodily integrity, and dignity interests is complicated because of the legal culture in
Canada, which occupies a middle ground between the European "dignity-based"
approach to privacy and the US "liberty-based" orientation. Most of the time,
1. Lisa Austin, "Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification" (2010) 55 McGill L.J.
165 at 168 (noting "there is little consensus regarding what privacy is and when it has been
violated"). See also Daniel J. Solove, "A Taxonomy of Privacy" (2006) 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477.
2. R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 at para. 104 [Grant].
3. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [Charter].
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wavering between these approaches does not seriously affect the outcome of
cases.' In contexts where the legality of a practice involving images of nude bodies
is unclear, however, occupying such a middle ground makes it difficult for deci-
sion makers to arrive at consistent and appropriate conclusions.
In his article entitled "The Two Western Cultures of Privacy," James Q.
Whitman distinguishes between the European and US approaches on the basis of
their divergent origins: a cultural premium on protecting reputation influenced
the development of European law, while protection from state intrusion into the
home informed the US approach.' He extends this distinction to approaches
toward bodily privacy in European and US contexts. The European understand-
ing of privacy rights-that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and
family life"'-considers dignity interests as integral to the right to respect for
private life. European privacy rights include an ongoing right to "the physical and
moral integrity of the person, including his or her sexual life,"' thus affording the
person protection which is not automatically lost by means of consent or publicity.
On the other hand, the US approach to privacy derives from "anxieties about
maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within our own walls," and therefore
focuses on the right to shield oneself from initial public exposure.! In the US
context, the right to bodily privacy-especially in photographs--can be lost or
traded away by being the subject of public attention or by consenting to share
information or images with another person.!
4. Where violations of bodily privacy interests are clear-such as cases dealing with making,
distributing, and possessing images of child sexual abuse-the particulars of the approach to
privacy do not tend to affect the result.
5. "The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty" (2004) 116 Yale LJ. 1151 at 1161.
6. Convention fr the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221.
7. The European Court of Human Rights considers these rights to apply not only to restrict
searches by state authorities, but also to require states to adopt measures that would "secure
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves."
Case ofX and Y v. The Netherlands, no. 8978/80 (26 March 1985) at para. 23 [Case ofXand
11. This case was brought against the Netherlands for failing to criminalize sexual activity with a
person with a mental disability that rendered that person incapable of consenting. In other
words, sexual assault and age of consent crimes are related to securing respect for "private life."
8. Whitman, supra note 5 at 1162.
9. As Whitman notes, US liberty-based approaches to privacy are strongly rooted in the reasonable
expectations paradigm wherein the expectations of adults are seriously reduced once a
photograph is willingly made and shared with another person. Ibid. at 1196-1202.
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In this article, I show that the Canadian approach rests somewhere between
the US and European approaches, but is closer to the European model (which
melds interests in privacy, bodily integrity, and human dignity) when intru-
sions upon the body are conceived as wholly non-consensual (e.g., strip searches,
voyeurism, and most forms of child pornography). Canada's allegiance to the
European model extends somewhat further to include those child pornography
cases where consent plays some role. However, once consent plays a more central
role that could factor into the outcome of the case, the US liberty-based approach
gains ground in Canadian jurisprudence. This wavering between approaches
occurs, for instance, in cases where consensually-made photographs are non-
consensually recontextualized.10 These cases demonstrate that, in Canada, dignity-
based interests in a minor's nude image persist as a right to control the context
in which images will be placed, though Canadian courts remain reluctant to
recognize these dignity interests as a form of privacy interests even here. Ongo-
ing dignity rights concerning one's nude image are thus more strongly articu-
lated in Canada than in the United States-but mostly with respect to minors,
as willingness to enforce ongoing dignity-based privacy interests of adults is
decidedly weaker.
The reluctance in Canada to fully align dignity with privacy, combined with
the differential protection of children and adults, has resulted in persistent public
confusion about the nature of privacy interests in nude images. This public con-
fusion, which is shared by policymakers, is apparent in news coverage of situations
at the margins of child pornography law, where the legality of certain practices
is unclear. News coverage, however, by distilling a legal debate for presentation
to the public, can reveal the cultural glue connecting assumptions about the law
that attempt to make sense of a legal or policy response. By identifying the gaps
and contradictions embedded in news coverage, one can learn about what broader
cultural work remains to be done to make rights regarding nude images com-
prehensible. I suggest that clearer alignment with a European dignity-based
approach to privacy interests in nude and sexual images would better address
the harms caused by misuse of photography as articulated in Canadian child
pornography jurisprudence and that this, in turn, would yield more certainty.
10. Recontextualization refers to instances in which a photograph is taken with the consent.of
the subject for a limited and specific audience, but is then taken out of that context or is more
widely distributed without the consent of the subject.
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Crucially, however, I also argue that once these harms are identified and rooted
in a dignity-based understanding of privacy, it will be even harder to justify with-
holding the same broader privacy protections afforded to children from adults.
Two recent examples of news coverage clearly illustrate popular confusion
over the nature of privacy interests in nude images, especially images of nude
children: first, the child pornography risk related to the use of body scanners in
Canadian airports and second, the appropriateness of child pornography charges
for youth exchanging sexual images among themselves. In both of these cases,
policymakers rather thinly invoke privacy as the primary legal rationale for
pursuing a particular policy direction. In both cases, invoking privacy harms
problematizes the parallel tendency to draw a sharp distinction between the
interests of children and adults.
In early 2010, the Government of Canada claimed to have successfully
addressed the general privacy concerns raised by the installation of body scanners
at the nation's airports following recommendations made by the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada. The next day, however, the government announced that
minors would be exempt from scanning entirely." This development resulted in
two front-page stories in the Toronto Star on 6 January 2010: one bearing the
headline "Travellers Face 'Virtual' Strip Search" and the other "Child Porn? Kids
Won't Be Scanned." 2 The "Child Porn?" article quoted Senator Colin Kenny,
chair of the Senate Committee on National Defence and Security, asking, "Why
are they excluding minors?" and included a file photo of Senator Kenny throwing
up his hands, emphasizing the inexplicability of the exemption from a security
perspective." The article portrayed the government as doggedly vague about the
reasons behind the exemption, with Transport Minister John Baird stating only
that "[c] oncerns were expressed with respect to children and we listened to those
concerns."" The article stressed the link to more universal privacy interests even
as the government actively resisted such a link, noting that Assistant Federal
11. Transport Canada, News Release, H002/10, "Government of Canada Invests in Full Body
and Behaviour Screening to Further Enhance Security at Canadian Airports" (5 January
2010), online: <http://www.tc.gc.caleng/mediaroom/releases-2010-hOO2e-5794.htm>.
12. Tonda MacCharles, "Travellers Face 'Virtual' Strip Search" Toronto Star (6 January 2010)
Al; Tonda MacCharles, "Child Porn? Kids Won't Be Scanned" Toronto Star (6 January
2010) Al [MacCharles, "Child Porn?"].
13. MacCharles, "Child Porn?," ibid.
14. Ibid.
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Privacy Commissioner Chantal Bernier had stated in an interview that her office's
recommendations had highlighted the "heightened" privacy concerns over the
scanning of children." The article left unexplained the reasons why children's
privacy concerns would be greater than those of adults. If the concern for
children's privacy interests arises from the possible misuse of nude images
produced by body scanners for sexual purposes, would not adults' interests also
be at risk? Or if the privacy concerns are inherent to the fact that a person will
be viewed naked by airport security personnel, then again, are not adult and child
interests alike? Since the source of concern is not elaborated, the distinction
between children and adults appears unfounded.
The second example concerns Canadian news reporting of US teenagers
charged with child pornography offences for circulating nude or sexual images
of their peers or themselves, despite the absence of comparable Canadian cases."
Both Canadian and US news coverage tend to lump together malicious exchanges
of such images with playful or romantic exchanges under the neologism "sex-
ting."" News coverage of legal arguments has sometimes suggested that these
non-malicious incidents are, at worst, invasions of privacy that should not be
considered child pornography. I suggest that a lesser criminal offence, such as
15. Ibid.
16. See e.g. Glenn Johnson, "Indiana Kids Face Felony Charges for 'Sexting'" {Saskatoon]
Star Phoenix (30 January 2010) C12; "Sexting's Sting" The Hamilton Spectator (30 April 2009)
A12; and Nicole Baute, "'Sexting' Nude Photos A Concern Among Teens; Is It Criminal
Behaviour or Just Today's Version of Spin the Bottle?" Toronto Star (9 January 2010) L10.
17. "Sexting" is a portmanteau which combines "sex" and "texting" and refers to the exchange of
sexual images and messages via mobile phones.
18. Amy Adler, a prominent First Amendment scholar, took part in a discussion of the US legal
approach to sexting on a Nightline segment on 1 April 2010. The NYU School of Law News
quoted her as saying that the malicious distribution of sexual images among peers is a
particularly bad kind of sexting, because it really is a malicious embarrassment of another
person." Adler added that
while there may be some sort of criminal sanction that's appropriate in this scenario, to me
child pornography law is simply inappropriate here. Again, because it's not the case of a pe-
dophile exploiting a child and sexually abusing that child in order to take a picture. It's more
of an invasion of privacy.
"On Nightline, Amy Adler Discusses Legal Consequences of Sexting" NYU School ofLaw
News (2 April 2010), online: <http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ADLERNIGHTLINE_
SEXTING>. For the original story, see Vicki Mabrey & David Perozzi, "'Sexting': Should
Child Pornography Laws Apply?" ABCNews (1 April 2010), online: <http://abcnews.go.com/
Nightline/phillip-alpert-sexting-teen-child-porn/story?id= 10252790>.
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invasion of privacy, may serve well as a discretionary alternative in such situa-
tions-as well as similar ones between adults-but I resist the implication found
in some news reporting that invasion of privacy is not an essential feature of child
pornography offences." Instead, it is precisely because dignity-based privacy
interests are protected by child pornography offences that we can identify the
more generalized wrongs of malicious distribution of intimate photos that affect
both adolescents and adults.
The contrast between these two scenarios is informative. News coverage of
body scanners melds privacy concerns with child pornography risks. Children are
portrayed as deserving higher levels of dignity-based privacy protection than adults,
even in a closely-controlled security environment. In contrast, cov/rage of sexual-
image exchange between peers may portray invasion of privacy as an alternative
harm, thereby separating privacy concerns of older youth from the dignity interests
protected by child pornography offences. Given the confusion exemplified by
these two news threads, it is important to clarify the nature of privacy violations in
Canadian child pornography law in relation to images of children.20 Identifying
and elaborating Canada's middle-ground stance between European dignity-based
and US liberty-based orientations to privacy can help to clarify these controversies.
Such an effort may also help to identify more principled solutions to violations of
privacy through photographs. The most appropriate solutions, I argue, would
predominantly include the extension of dignity-based privacy protections further
into those contexts where consent currently plays a central legal role, thereby
drawing more consistent parallels between the privacy interests of children and
adults. The capacity to provide legal consent would then no longer reduce a per-
son's protection from violations of bodily privacy caused by misuse of photography,
such as unauthorized circulation of airport scanner images or intimate photos.
In order to fully elaborate the nature of dignity-based privacy interests in
Canadian law, Part I sets out the interests in privacy, bodily integrity, and dignity
19. See Andrea Slane, "Sexting, Teens and a Proposed Offence of Invasion of Privacy" IP Osgoode
(16 March 2009), online: <http://www.iposgoode.ca/2009/03/sexting-teens-and-a-proposed-
offence-of-invasion-of-privacy/> [Slane, "Sexting"].
20. I have chosen to ignore the indirect harms to children set out in R. v. Sharpe (i.e., cognitive
distortions about children as appropriate sexual partners, use in grooming children for sexual
abuse, fuelling fantasies of pedophiles, and contributions to the market for child pornography)
and limit my discussion to harms to the real people who are the subjects of such photographs.
See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [Sharpe].
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discussed in search and seizure jurisprudence. Part II considers the Supreme
Court of Canada's approach to two types of privacy harms suffered by sexual
abuse victims depicted in child pornography, as discussed in R. v. Sharpe." Part
III then explores how, in Sharpe and subsequent child pornography case law,
judges have elaborated on the nature of the privacy harms caused by misuse of
photography in situations where the photograph does not clearly document sexual
abuse. This progression through the Canadian case law highlights a trend toward
greater refinement of the dignity-based privacy interests at stake. I argue in con-
clusion that recognizing these interests should support the extension to adults of
the protections that are currently afforded to minors.
I. PRIVACY, BODILY INTEGRITY, AND DIGNITY INTERESTS
IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
Canadian judicial discussion of the interrelationship between privacy, bodily
integrity, and human dignity has focused on section 8 Charter challenges to police
strip searches and on the harms to victims of child pornography.22 Discussion in
the section 8 case law is particularly robust, as it is the primary task of the courts
to determine whether and how a defendant's section 8 rights were violated. In
child pornography cases, however, discussion of the harm to victims is secondary
to a court's primary task of determining whether the defendant committed an
offence and appears mostly at the sentencing stage as a factor pointing to the
gravity of the offence. Nonetheless, borrowing from the strip search case law can
help to frame a discussion about privacy rights violations in child pornography.
Since violations of privacy, bodily integrity, and dignity can occur not only via
the photographic depiction of sexual abuse, but also via photography that, while
not depicting abuse, is taken or distributed in a sexually abusive way, a discussion
of section 8 case law related to recording technologies will also be helpful.
The strip search and recording technology threads of section 8 case law
operate within the broader constitutional protection of privacy, which identifies
three major realms of privacy: territorial (or spatial), personal,. and informational.23
21. Ibid.
22. Charter, supra note 3, s. 8 ("Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure").
23. R v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 at para. 19 [Dyment], citing Department of Communications
& Department ofJustice, Privacy and Computer; (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) at 12-14.
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Territorial claims were originally tied to property-especially the home-and
have expanded to include a reasonable expectation of privacy in other areas.2h
Personal privacy has been linked to the "sanctity of a person's body," with a focus
on the affront to human dignity of state intrusions upon one's body.25 In other
words, privacy concerns the invasion of a person's body in a moral sense, not just
in a physical one.26 Informational privacy pertains to a person's right to control
personal information, which is also "based on the notion of the dignity and
integrity of the individual. "27
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the three realms of privacy protection,
but noted that personal privacy deserves the highest level of protection while
informational privacy is subject to greater justifiable encroachments than the
other two realms. 28 In R. v. Tessling, the Court noted that "[p]rivacy of the person
perhaps has the strongest claim to constitutional shelter because it protects bodily
integrity, and in particular the right not to have our bodies touched or explored
to disclose objects or matters we wish to conceal," 29 but that "[b]eyond our bodies
and the places where we live and work, however, lies the thorny question of how
much information about ourselves and activities we are entitled to shield from
the curious eyes of the state."3 0 The degree to which an individual can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information, and consequently is
entitled to protection under section 8, depends on the nature of the information."'
The distinction between personal privacy and informational privacy is potentially
relevant to discussions of nude or sexual photographs, insofar as such photographs
24. Dyment, ibid. at para. 20 ("territorial claims were originally legally and conceptually tied to
property ... [but] what is protected is people, not places").
25. Ibid. at para. 21.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at para. 22.
28. R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 at para. 20 [Tessling]. The case concerned police use of
infra-red technology to read heat emissions from a residential home without a warrant. The
decision turned on whether the police's use of the infra-red technology implicated the accused's
personal, territorial, or informational privacy and whether the resulting information violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy. A unanimous Court ruled that the search mainly involved
the informational zone and that it did not constitute an infringement of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
29. Ibid. at para. 21.
30. Ibid. at para. 23 [emphasis in original].
31. Ibid. at para. 27.
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affect both personal and informational privacy, as I will demonstrate in Parts II
and III of this article.
The underlying principled rationale for protecting privacy interests wavers
in Canada's section 8 case law between fidelity to human dignity on the one hand
and human liberty on the other. The former appears to be somewhat separate
from and broader than privacy (e.g., respect for one's full personhood)," while
the latter is "[g]rounded in man's physical and moral autonomy, [where] privacy
is essential for the well-being of the individual."" This in-between approach to
privacy means that it is not always clear whether affronts to personal or infor-
mational privacy are privacy violations because they amount to indignities on a
person (the European approach), or whether the dignity violations are separate
from and exceed the concept of privacy (the US approach). These issues are crucial
to understanding some of the complexities troubling public discussion of airport
scanners and sexting, which I will clarify in the course of the analysis below. First,
I set out section 8 jurisprudence concerning strip searches in order to demonstrate
how Canadian law handles issues of dignity and privacy in relation to coercive
bodily intrusions.
A. STRIP SEARCHES
The Supreme Court has defined a strip search as "the removal or rearrangement
of some or all of the clothing of a person to permit a visual inspection of a person's
private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or under-
garments."" The interests affronted by strip searches are similar to those at issue in
the child pornography context: both involve the exposure of private areas of the
body for visual inspection by others. In R. v. Golden, the Court held that the ex-
posure of private areas makes this type of search more intrusive than a pat-down
search over clothing, but that visual inspection is generally less intrusive than physi-
32. Dignity interests have been more fully discussed in Charter challenges based on the guarantee
of equality rights in s. 15. See e.g. Trociuk v. British Columbia (A.G.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835.
33. Dyment, supra note 23 at para. 17, citing Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York:
Atheneum, 1967) at 349-50. In Tessling, the Court quotes Westin's definition of informational
privacy in liberty-based terms: "[tihe claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others." Tessling, supra note 28 at para. 23, citing Westin at 7.
34. R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 at para. 47 [Golden]. The case concerns how to determine
when a warrantless strip search conducted in a public place incident to an arrest is permissible
under the Charter.
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cal searches (e.g., body cavity searches)." In its focus on strip searches, this case law
thus addresses the conditions under which a person may be subjected to visual
inspection of their private areas by a state agent. Since no one could reasonably
be expected to freely choose to be subjected to such inspections, these are always
coercive situations, even when a suspect is cooperating with authorities.
The strip search case law discusses privacy rights in the context of how to assess
whether a particular search was conducted in an abusive or reasonable manner.
Throughout, the boundaries between privacy and broader dignity violations are
blurry, since aspects of privacy violations are rooted in dignity interests, but dignity
interests are cast as larger than privacy interests alone. The violations of bodily
integrity described in R. v. Stillman as "the ultimate affront to human dignity""
refer primarily to intrusive physical touching of the defendant's body (e.g., to
retrieve bodily samples), but also include exposing the defendant's body to view.
The Court in Golden considers that "visual inspection of the appellant's buttocks, in
and of itself, interfered with his privacy, dignity, and integrity."" Touching is not
necessarily intrusive; an ordinary frisk search over clothing involves a "minimal
invasion of the detainee's privacy and personal integrity."" The removal or
rearrangement of clothing, however, results in "the serious infringement of
privacy and personal dignity that is an inevitable consequence of a strip search.""
Consequently, a "higher degree of justification is required in order to support the
higher degree of interference with individual freedom and dignity.""o The Court
deems strip searches to be "inherently humiliating and degrading for detainees
regardless of the manner in which they are carried out" and notes that "[s]ome
commentators have gone as far as to describe strip searches as 'visual rape.'".
The Court repeatedly refrains, however, from distinguishing between privacy,
dignity, and bodily integrity, preferring instead to consider these interests as both
similar and distinct, and as simultaneously infringed by an improperly conducted
strip search. The Court seems to associate dignity interests with the exposure of
35. Ibid. at para. 89.
36. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 at para. 39. See also Golden, supra note 34 at para. 76.
37. Golden, ibid. at para. 106.
38. Ibid. at para. 98.
39. Ibid. at para. 99.
40. Ibid. at para. 98.
41. Ibid at para. 90. The Court also cites Paul R. Shuldiner, "Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious
Legality of Strip Searches" (1979) 13 J. Marshall L. Rev. 273.
554 (2010) 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
a person's private areas, under conditions devoid of free choice. Dignity-preserving
measures that follow from this thinking include allowing a person to remove his
or her own clothing. The privacy-specific violations inherent to strip searches, on
the other hand, are discernible in the Court's recommendations for proper strip
search protocols, such as encouraging police to conduct searches inside a police
station, rather than in the field.42 This approach correlates the gravity of the
privacy violation with the degree to which a strip search has been conducted
under public versus private conditions. Since at least one officer needs to be
present, a strip search is never conducted entirely in private, and so some violation
of privacy interests is inherent.4 3
Dignity interests are more generally treated as "interests beyond the right of
privacy" in section 8 case law," such that an unreasonable search impacts "the
protected interests of privacy, and more broadly, human dignity."" This tendency
to partially separate dignity violations from privacy violations-which in strip
search contexts are limited to the degree to which a person controls the exposure
of his or her body to an audience-is significant in that this same separation
appears in (and troubles) child pornography case law and the public perception
of the privacy interests that it protects.
This analysis also helps make sense of the contrast between the Government
of Canada's assurances that "privacy concerns" were adequately addressed in the
deployment of body scanners in Canadian airports,"4 while some European
governments continue to consider the machines to be intolerably violative of
privacy interests.4 ' The measures listed in the government's background to the
press release focus on a narrower understanding of privacy interests, and only
require minimizing the public exposure aspect of the search and safeguarding
informational privacy:
42. Golden, ibid. at paras. 10 1-02.
43. Ibid at para. 104 ("the factors set out above ensure that when strip searches are carried out ...
they are conducted in a manner that interferes with the privacy and dignity of the person being
searched as little as possible").
44. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 159.
45. Grant, supra note 2 at para. 78.
46. Transport Canada, supra note 11.
47. "'Strip Search Scanners': Germany Reconsiders Controversial Airport Security Measure" Speigel
Online (12 December 2009), online: <http://www.spiegel.de/incernational/germany/
0.1518,669574.00.html>.
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Passenger privacy is fully respected because the technology does not retain personal
information from the passengers it screens. The image is not correlated in any way
with the name of the passenger or any other identifying information. The screening
officer will review the images in a separate room, and will not be able to view the
passenger; and the screening officer who is in control of the passenger will not be
able to view the image from the full body scanner. In addition, the images are deleted
from the system as soon as the review is complete."
These measures, however, do not address the inherent violation of dignity-based
interests that a visual inspection of a person's private areas entails. Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada Jennifer Stoddart issued a more expansive statement,
wherein dignity-based interests are partially reunited with the government's
narrower understanding of privacy. She writes that "while any invasion of privacy
is deplorable, the federal government has promised to respect the privacy and
human dignity of travelers."" She reports that passengers who are asked to submit
to a secondary screening (after the usual metal detectors) will be allowed to choose
between a pat-down search and the body scan. Dignity-based violations, for
Stoddart, are thus minimized by the voluntary nature of the body scans,so which
suggests agreement-at least implicitly-with the US liberty-based approach.
From a European perspective, however, dignity interests are not easily protected
by consent alone, since affronts to human dignity are a collective concern.
Consequently, European airport authorities that approved the use of body scan-
ners are using software that projects a stylized image of a human body, rather
than the actual outlines of the individual being scanned 52 In Canada, such
48. Transport Canada, supra note 11.
49. "Airport Security Scanners Must Respect Privacy, Privacy Commissioner Insists," Op-ed
(January 2010), online: <http://www.priv.gc.calmedia/nr-c/2010/op-ed-100107_e.cfm>.
50. Ibid Stoddart also notes that though blurring the image of "specific body parts" was discussed,
such measures were rejected because they would undermine the security value of the scanners.
51. Famous European cases illustrating the Continental approach to human dignity as non-
negotiable include the "dwarf-tossing" case in France (where a person's willingness to engage
in an activity that is deemed to be an affront to human dignity did not outweigh the state's
right to enact the legislation and did not constitute discrimination) and German jurisprudence
related to pornography (which distinguishes between degrading images that treat the subject
of the images as an object and are consequently an affront to human dignity and those that
are not). Manuel Wackenheim v. France, UN HRC, 75th Sess., UN Doc.CCPR/C/75/D/
854/1999 (2002). For discussion of the German approach to pornography, see Donald P.
Kommers, The ConstitutionalJurisprudence ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1997) at 425.
52. MacCharles, "Child Porn?," supra note 12.
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measures were considered but rejected as compromising security objectives." The
same security versus privacy balancing exercise ended differently in Europe and
Canada because, in this instance, Canada leaned toward the US liberty-based
model in which consent suffices to dispel concern."
Returning to the role played by concerns about child pornography in the
Canadian debate, when pressed to justify the exclusion of minors from airport
body scanners, the government quickly explained that minors could not give
valid consent." Interestingly, this explanation does not appear to have been
vetted by the privacy commissioner's office" and is not supported by Cana-
dian law, since generally a legal guardian can give consent on behalf of a minor."
53. Stoddart, supra note 49.
54. Privacy concerns have not held up the deployment of body scanners at US airports, where they
have become a means of primary and mandatory screening. This is not to say that US privacy
advocates are not concerned about their use, but rather that privacy concerns do not carry
the same weight capable of delaying the use of the technology in the US context. The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a US-based privacy advocacy group, has recently
filed a lawsuit to stay the use of body scanners in US airports pending review of possible
violations of privacy rights located in a variety of US sources, including the Fourth Amendment
of the US Constitution, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. For full
documentation related to this suit, see Electronic Privacy Information Center, "EPIC v. DHS
(Suspension of Body Scanner Program)" (2 July 2010), online: <http://epic.org/privacy/
body-scanners/epic v dhssuspension of body.html>. A grassroots effort to lodge a protest
against the scanners as an inherent dignity-based invasion of privacy also declared 24 November
2010, the day before US Thanksgiving and thus the busiest air travel day in the year, as
"National Opt-Out Day," where travellers are urged to "opt out" of the scans and thereby slow
down the security screening measures in protest. See National Opt-Out Day, online: <http://
www.optoutday.com>.
55. Richard J. Brennan, "Some Nations Treated 'Differently'; Baird Says Travellers from 145
Countries Face Strict Visa Rules; Defends Scanner Exemption for Minors" Toronto Star (7
January 2010) A06.
56. Ibid.
57. With the exception of photography that qualifies as child pornography, legal guardians are
generally empowered to give consent regarding personal information collection (including
consent to be photographed) on behalf of minor children. A letter that the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada sent to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority in
October 2009 reportedly noted the Commissioner's understanding that airport officials
would only scan minors with the consent of guardians accompanying them. Jim Bronskill,
"Privacy Watchdog OKs 'Naked' Airport Scanners" Toronto Star (30 October 2009) A14. See
also Personal Infrirmation Protection Act Regulations, B.C. Reg. 473/2003, s. 2(2)(c) (a guardian
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The government's focus on a minor's incapacity to consent reveals two issues:
first, that the government is willing to concede that full-body scanners can be
used to produce child pornography (a conclusion likely reached for political,
rather than legal reasons);" and second, that consequently the broader, non-
negotiable dignity interests re-enter the debate, although the government is
attempting to confine them to situations where consent cannot be validly obtained
directly from the subject.
B. RECORDING DEVICES
The second thread of Canadian section 8 jurisprudence relevant to the child
pornography context concerns surreptitious electronic recordings of conversations
and actions. These cases shed some light on how Canadian law conceives of
privacy in relation to recording technologies (e.g., hidden cameras, surveillance
cameras, and hidden microphones) where the dominant paradigms are the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and consent. Strip search cases do not address these
elements because strip searches inherently impinge upon reasonable expectations
of privacy and are intrinsically coercive. The recording technology case law thus
helps to clarify the Canadian approach to the role of consent in determining
whether privacy and dignity rights have been violated. This is especially relevant
when determining an appropriate approach to the circulation of consensually-
made sexual images amon'g teenagers.
Surreptitious recording cases address privacy as a right to limit the audience
for private matters, at least vis- -vis the state, and not as a matter encroaching
of a minor can "give or refuse consent to the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information of the minor under the Act, if the minor is incapable of exercising that right").
58. Ian Dowty, legal adviser to Action on Rights for Children (a British children's rights
organization), is quoted in the Toronto Star as saying, "As we've seen on the Internet, these
machines clearly show genitalia, that in our view must result in an indecent image by any
definition." MacCharles, "Child Porn?," *supra note 12. The Government of Canada under
Prime Minister Stephen Harper has taken a particularly hard line on child pornography
offences and may well agree with Dowty's position. However, the position that any nude image
of a child is inherently child pornography is much broader than the current definition of child
pornography set out in Canadian law. As elaborated below, Canadian child pornography law
allows for a defence of legitimate purpose that would surely cover the airport scanners.
Consequently, child pornography offences would legally only arise with respect to these images
in the event of their misuse for illegitimate purposes (i.e., by individuals who viewed the
scans for sexual purposes, or saved or circulated the resulting images outside the airport
security context).
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upon human dignity per se. In R. v. Duarte,s" the Supreme Court struck down
the police practice of warrantless participant surveillance, whereby any party to
a conversation could consent to the use of electronic surveillance equipment. The
Court strongly distinguished the level of privacy that one can expect when talking
to or otherwise interacting with a person in the flesh from that which one can
expect when interactions are recorded."o The Court thereby departed from a
practice upheld in the United States that affords much less privacy protection to
information held by third parties." The Court, however, placed an emphasis on
the surreptitiousness of these recordings, leaving it unclear whether a similar right to
control who listens to them exists once a person has consented to being recorded:
[T]he assessment whether the surreptitious recording trenches on a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy must turn on whether the person whose words were recorded
spoke in circumstances in which it was reasonable for that person to expect that his
or her words would only be heard by the persons he or she was addressing. As I see it,
where persons have reasonable grounds to believe their communications are private
communications in the sense defined above, the unauthorized surreptitious elec-
tronic recording of those communications cannot fail to be perceived as an intru-
sion on a reasonable expectation of privacy.62
The Court in Duarte focuses on the idea that, though one cannot control an-
other person's recounting of events or conversations witnessed, one should be
able to expect that these events cannot be turned into a permanent record able
to be distributed to others absent one's consent." The Court only considers
non-consensual recording as seriously compromising that person's reasonable
expectation to be protected from the public exposure of the events captured
on the recording. It is unclear whether the inverse-that consent to recording
59. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Duarte]. The Court extended the principles in Duarte to surreptitious
video recording in R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 at paras. 43-44.
60. Duarte, ibid. at paras. 28-31.
61. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976). The second case concerned cheques and deposit slips held by a bank. The Court ruled
that there was
no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not confidential
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only informa-
tion voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business (at 442).
62. Duarte, supra note 59 at para. 28.
63. Ibid. at para. 30.
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consequently reduces expectations of privacy regarding further distribution of
the recording-is implied."
While section 8 jurisprudence struggles with such questions, the Quebec
Charter ofHuman Rights and Freedoms offers greater clarity in its assurance that
"[e]very person has a right to respect for his private life."" This guarantee in the
Quebec Charter closely reflects European human rights instruments and thus
their dignity-based orientation to privacy. That orientation has had a meaningful
impact in privacy jurisprudence in Quebec. In Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa," for
example, the Supreme Court takes the Quebec Charter provision to protect
against non-consensual photography, even in public places, and invokes the
comments of a French scholar to support ongoing digrity-based privacy interests
in images of oneself:
Such a feeling is likely to be offended each time a photographer invades someone's
privacy or serves it up to the public. The camera lens captures a human moment at
its most intense, and the snapshot "defiles" that moment. The privileged instant of
personal life becomes "this object image offered to the curiosity of the greatest
number." A person surprised in his or her private life by a roving photographer is
stripped of his or her transcendency and human dignity, since he or she is reduced
to the status of a "spectacle" for others. ... This "indecency of the image" deprives
those photographed of their most secret substance.67
In this statement, the harms of objectification are still linked to consent, such that
harms to dignity are linked to a lack of consent and the attendant harms to
autonomy interests. Nevertheless, the harms are broader than those contemplated
by the US liberty-based approach to privacy in that they persist even in public
64. No section 8 cases will likely address ongoing privacy interests in private recordings that
were meant to be used in a specific context for a limited audience and period of time,
since such recordings would not in themselves qualify as searches if they were made by
someone other than a state agent. Instead, they are merely evidence and subject to the
commensurate rules.
65. R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 5 [Quebec Charter].
66. [1998 1 S.C.R. 591 [Aubry].
67. Ibid. at para. 69, L'Heureux-Dub6 & Bastarache JJ., citing Jaques Ravanas, La protection
des personnes contre la rialisation et la publication de leur image (Paris: Librairie gdndrale
de droit et de jurisprudence, 1978) at 388 [trans. by L'Heureux-Dub6 & Bastarache JJ.,
ellipsis in original].
560 120101 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
spaces." Since even a person in plain public view retains privacy interests, the
Court in Aubry opens the door to possible recognition of dignity-based privacy
interests that could persist where a person has consented to being photographed
for a limited audience.
Whether Duarte and Aubry contribute to a normative right to control the
audience for consensually-made recordings remains to be seen. Since the existence
of photographs factually diminishes an individual's control of the resulting images
(in that a document that can be circulated now exists), a narrowly factual approach
to reasonableness might conclude that consenting to be photographed should
reduce a person's reasonable expectation, of privacy in that photograph. A
dignity-based approach, on the other hand, would not hinge on the widespread
social disregard for privacy as the yardstick for reasonableness. Instead, the degree
to which a person was objectified or turned into an instrument for use by others
would be of primary concern. The child pornography jurisprudence reviewed
below helps to clarify this distinction.
II. HARMS TO PRIVACY AND DIGNITY OF SEXUAL ABUSE
VICTIMS IN R. V SHARPE
The Criminal Code amendments in 1993 that created Canada's original child
pornography offences" followed Canada's ratification in 1991 of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child," which required signatories to take appropriate legisla-
tive action to protect minors under eighteen years of age from "all forms of sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse," including "exploitative use of children in por-
nographic performances and materials."" The language and theory of children's
rights scholarship thoroughly informed the new child pornography offences, but
the language of the offences did not explicitly link sexual exploitation with
68. Aubry, ibid. at para. 70. The judgment assesses damages by way of the social harm caused to
the complainant rather than relying on any inherent harm in the act of non-consensual
photography itself.
69. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1 [Criminal Code].
70. Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force 2 September 1990, accession by Canada 13 December 1991) [CRC].
71. Ibid., art. 34(c). For an in-depth account of the history of Canada's approach to child
pornography vis-i-vis international obligations, see Jane Bailey, "Confronting Collective
Harm: Technology's Transformative Impact on dhild Pornography" (2007) 56 U.N.B.L.J.
65 at 68-75.
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privacy rights. The Supreme Court's reasons in Sharpe, however, dedicate sig-
nificant space to the elaboration of the harms that child pornography causes to
children; it is here that the Court explicitly discusses the underlying dignity and
privacy rights of children pictured in child pornography." Although scholarly
debate about an offender's privacy rights under the Charter's freedom of expres-
sion guarantee has been fairly robust," and advocates for strong protection of
children's rights have stressed the harm caused to child pornography victims," the
violation of privacy rights as another form of harm to children has only recently
received scholarly attention.7s
Chief Justice McLachlin's majority opinion in Sharpe conceives of harm as
defined by its effects on real children whose sexual abuse is pictured in photo-
graphs and videos that indisputably qualify as child pornography. The primary
harm to this population is established using research showing that victims
pictured in recorded and circulated child pornography suffer psychological
harms over and above those suffered by victims of child sexual abuse without
recording." The harm to victims caused by recording technologies is captured in
the frequently invoked concept of a "permanent record of abuse and exploita-
72. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 1. The defendant, Sharpe, challenged the child pornography
possession offence on freedom of expression grounds.
73. Charter, supra note 3, s. 2(b). See e.g. June Ross, "R. v. Sharpe and Private Possession of Child
Pornography" (2000) 11 Const. Forum Const. 50; Wayne MacKay, "R v. Sharpe. Pornography,
Privacy, Proportionality and the Protection of Children" (2000) 12 N.J.C.L. 113; Travis
Johnson, "Child Pornography in Canada and the United States: The Myth of Right Answers"
(2006) 29 Dal. L.J. 375; and Stan Persky & John Dixon, On Kiddie Porn: Sexual Representation,
Free Speech, and the Robin Sharpe Case (Vancouver: New Star Books, 2000).
74. See e.g. Janine Benedet, "Children in Pornography after Sharpe" (2002) 43 C. de D. 327;
Sonja Grover, "Oppression of Children Intellectualized as Free Expression under the Canadian
Charter: A Reanalysis of the Sharpe Possession of Child Pornography Case" (2004) 11 Int'l J.
Child. Res. 311.
75. Jane Bailey, "Toward an Equality-Enhancing Conception of Privacy" (2008) 31 Dal. L.J.
267; Jane Bailey, "Missing Privacy through Individuation: The Treatment of Privacy in the
Canadian Case Law on Hate, Obscenity, and Child Pornography" (2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 55;
and Sara M. Smyth, "A 'Reasoned Apprehension' of Overbreadth: An Alternative Approach to
the Problems Presented by Section 163.1 of the Ciminal Code" (2009) 42 U.B.C. L. Rev. 69.
76. See e.g. Roger J.R. Levesque, SexualAbuse of Children: A Human Rights Perspective (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1999); Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, eds., Viewing Child Pornography
on the Internet: Understanding the Offence, Managing the Offender, Helping the Victims (Dorset,
England: Russell House Publishing, 2005).
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tion."" Abuse victims who are featured in child pornography struggle more to
recover frpm their abuse, fear that they may be recognized by anyone at any
time from the images, and experience a loss of control over what, when, and
to whom they can disclose their abuse experiences." Some of these harms are
rooted in the ongoing affront that such images are to the victim's dignity (that is,
turning the victim into an object for use by others) and others stem from loss
of control over the audience for the image and the information it contains
(e.g., that the person pictured is a victim of sexual abuse).
Chief Justice McLachlin describes the harm resulting from "the abuse of
children in the production of pornography" as follows:
The child is traumatized by being used as a sexual object in the course of making the
pornography. The child may be sexually abused and degraded. The trauma and
violation of dignity may stay with the child as long as he or she lives. ... [T]he child
must live in the years that follow with the knowledge that the degrading photo or film
may still exist, and may at any moment be being watched and enjoyed by someone.
Possessors of pornographic images of real children thus continually revictimize
the child by using that moment of the child's abuse for their own gratification
(the dignity-based harm of sexual objectification) and by having access to
privileged information about the victim (hence damaging the victim's capacity
to control his or her presentation of self to others)." Each of these can be
considered privacy rights violations, depending on the cultural-theoretical*
rationale underlying the concept of privacy in operation. A dignity-based ap-
proach to privacy would see both sexual objectification and the circulation of
private information as privacy harms; a liberty-based approach tends not to
recognize sexual objectification as a privacy harm unless the sexual contact and
photography were wholly non-consensual and has difficulty with protecting sexual
information where the subject legally consented to acts. Canadian wavering
between these two approaches is elaborated below.
77. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 169, L'Heureux-Dub6 J., concurring. The phrase "permanent
record of the victim's abuse" also appears in the majority decision in the leading US case on
the constitutionality of child pornography possession offences. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103 at 111 (1990).
78. Tink Palmer, "Behind the Screen: Children Who Are the Subjects of Abusive Images" in
Quayle & Taylor, eds., supra note 76, 61.
79. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 92.
80. See Austin, supra note 1.
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A. BODILY INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEXUAL
OBJECTIFICATION
The term "exploitation" is used in the Criminal Code to describe offences where
the offender exerts power to coerce a person to perform for the benefit of the
offender or where a person's vulnerabilities have been taken advantage of for the
benefit of the offender."' The term is used in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,82 and is implicit in the two main types of visual images involving real
children that are prohibited in. child pornography offences: first, where people
under eighteen years of age are engaged in or depicted as engaged in explicit
sexual activity and second, where the dominant characteristic of the image is the
depiction of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under eighteen "for a
sexual purpose."83 Both types of images are considered exploitative because
minors are at a presumed power disadvantage compared with the photographer
(except in very limited intimate circumstances). Minors are deemed to be legally
incapable of overcoming the exploitative nature of these dynamics through
consent, making child pornography cases fertile ground for expanding dignity-
based privacy in the absence of the complications of consent.
The reasons for setting the age of consent for sexual photography higher than
the age of consent to engage in sexual relations were discussed by the Court of
Appeal of Alberta in R. v. Hewlett," a case dealing with sexually explicit photo-
graphs of minors meant for commercial distribution via an adult porn website.
The teenagers involved had responded to an advertisement asking for models over
age eighteen. The court reiterated that a child's right to be protected from ex-
ploitation is at the core of the child pornography offences," cited the descriptions
of harms to children from the majority and concurring judgments in Sharpe,"
and rejected the defence argument that photographs of older teenagers (in this
case, the models were fifteen, sixteen and seventeen years old) should be treated
81. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 153 (sexual exploitation), s. 153.1 (sexual exploitation of a
person with a disability), s. 279.01 (trafficking in persons).
82. CRC, supra note 70, art. 34.
83. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 16 3.1(1)(a).
84. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 116.
85. (2002), 312 A.R. 165 [Hewlett].
86. Ibid at paras. 19-20.
87. Ibid at paras. 21-23.
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differently than photographs of younger children vis-:-vis the requirements for
the offence:
The protection afforded by the legislation extends to all children under 18, no matter
their age, and rightly so. Society has recognized the legitimate need to safeguard all
children in this category from exploitative conduct. Children are not adults and
cannot be expected to exercise judgment as if they were.88
Hewlett thus makes clear that sexual photography is a specific type of presump-
tively "exploitative conduct," and minors cannot be legally expected to fully
appreciate its exploitative nature. The bold lines drawn between adults and
minors are justified by a general fiduciary obligation of the legal system to pro-
tect the interests of vulnerable parties, including children."
Canadian child pornography case law includes many instances where a
minor's involvement in child pornography was ancillary to commercial sexual
exploitation (e.g., prostitution or for-profit pornography),90 or where a more
informal exploitation occurs, such as participation in sexual photographs for
money, drugs, alcohol, shelter, or other gifts." Some feminist scholars have
considered the very idea that any person could exchange consent to sexual
photography for money or other collateral to be inherently demeaning to human
dignity,92 while others stress that consent determines whether a person's dignity
88. Ibid. at para. 24. The court notes that where offences involve images of younger children or
sexual violence, these facts can be considered aggravating factors. It does not follow, however,
that the fact that the images involved youth at the higher end of the prohibited range (that is,
closer to age eighteen) and depicted no violence should be considered mitigating factors.
89. I do not take issue here with the distinction between minors and adults regarding capacity to
consent. Differential treatment is arguably justified by developmental differences between
children and adults, but such differences have no bearing on the underlying privacy interest
that I have argued is shared by adults and children alike.
90. R. v. G.P. (2004), 229 N.S.R. (2d) 61 (CA); R v. Hunt (2002), 6 Alta. L.R. (4th) 238 (CA);
R v. Bauer, [1999] O.J. No. 5294 (Ct. J.) (QL); and R v..McGowan (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d)
461 (Ont. Ct. J.).
91. R. v. B.HL., [2009] A.J. No. 163 (Prov. Ct.) (QL); R. v. Johnson (2008), 317 Sask. R. 123
(Q.B.); R. v. Shablak (2007), 264 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 167 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)); R. v. Jewell
(1995), 100 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lee (1998), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 363 (N.W.T.
S.C.); and R v. Henricks, [19991 B.C.J. No. 1246 (S.C.) (QL).
92. See e.g. Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech" (1985) 20 Harv.
C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 1.
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is damaged or remains intact." Taking consent out of the legal equation for minors
means that sexual photography is always non-consensual and hence exploitative
(again, except in very limited, intimate circumstances). However, the issue of
adolescent consent to sexual photography continues to complicate those cases
where more straightforward forms of exploitation are absent or unclear."
The description of offending images in the second category (whose
"dominant characteristic" is the depiction of sexual organs) implicitly ac-
knowledges that some images that prominently feature a minor's sexual or-
gans may not be inherently exploitative: where the image is not intended for
use "for a sexual purpose." Sexual purposes are assumed to convert a neutral
nude photo into an exploitative one by sexually objectifying the child who is
pictured." The boundaries of exploitative and non-exploitative nude imagery
are notoriously blurry; the investigation and sometimes prosecution of non-
abusing parents in the United States is a commonly invoked example of
over-reach in child pornography laws by critics who decry such laws' deeper
incursion into freedom of expression.9 6 In any case, it is the fiduciary obliga-
tion to protect minors from their increased risk of exploitation that also in-
forms this second type of prohibited image, where again it is the sexual
objectification of a minor's body that is deemed to be exploitative and an affront
to human dignity."
Changes to the available defences to Canada's child pornography offences,
enacted in 2005, depict child pornography as always fundamentally about the
exploitation of children via sexual objectification."' Under the old law, the accused
had a defence if the material "ha[d] artistic merit or an educational, scientific or
93. See e.g. Carol S. Vance, "More Pleasure, More Danger: A Decade after the Barnard Sexuality
Conference" in Carol S. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, 2d ed..
(London: Pandora, 1992) xvi.
94. See Part III(B), below.
95. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 51.
96. For a recent example, see Dan Przygoda, "Couple Sues Walmart for Calling Cops Over Bath
Time Photos: Children Were Taken Into Protective Custody Over Pictures Taken at Bath
Time" ABCNews (20 September 2009), online: <http://abcnews.go.com/GMALWeekend/
parents-sue-wal-mart-children-bath-time-photos/comments?type=story&id=8622696>.
97. See Parts III(A) and III(B)(1), below.
98. Department of Justice Canada, Backgrounder, "Highlights of Bill C-2 Amendments to
Protect Children and Other Vulnerable Persons" (July 2005), online: <hrtp://www.justice.
gc.caleng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2005/doc..31584.html>.
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medical purpose""-a factual determination based on the nature of the materials.
The new defences provide exemption for acts that have "a legitimate purpose
related to the administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art"
and that do not "pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen
years."'o The combined requirements of "legitimate purpose" and no "undue risk
of harm" to minors shift emphasis away from the expression rights of offenders
(where an image could conceivably have artistic merit despite being exploitative
of the youth pictured)'' and toward the prevention of harm to children (where
even if an image has a legitimate artistic purpose, it is indefensible if it poses an
undue risk of harm).'O2
Parliament's reasoning in effecting the latest amendments is ostensibly similar
to that of the US Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber,103 which held that child
pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection. The judgment
quotes a New York assemblyman who supported the law, stating that "it is
irrelevant to the child [who has been abused] whether or not the material ...
has a literary, artistic, political or social value."10 The US law only applies to
images of real children, while the Canadian law is significantly broader, as it
applies to drawings and fictional stories. However, the US and Canadian ra-
tionales for not allowing artistic or other merit defences to override harms to
real children pictured in child pornography coincide.
Thus far, criminalizing child pornography is mainly justified by a legal system's
obligation to protect minors from sexual exploitation, based on the belief that
youth are more vulnerable to exploitation because of their still-developing
reasoning capacity, lower financial and social independence, and lack of life
99. The full provision, prior to the 2005 amendments, read: "[w]here the accused is charged with
an offence under subsection (2), (3), (4) or (4.1), the court shall find the accused not guilty if
the representation or written material that is alleged to constitute child pornography has artistic
merit or an educational, scientific or medical purpose." Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 163.1(6),
as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 46, s. 2; S.C. 2002, c. 13, s. 5.
100. Ibid., s. 163.1(6).
101. McLachlin C.J.C. notes this possibility in Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 65 ("Parliament clearly
intended that some pornographic and possibly harmful works would escape prosecution on the
basis of this defence; otherwise there is no need for it").
102. R. v. Katigbak (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.).
103. 458 U.S. 747 (2000) [Ferber].
104. Ibid. at 761.
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experience.' By rooting the harm of child pornography in sexual objectification
as an injury to human dignity, however, the Canadian case law provides a segue
to a consideration of whether that harm is also conceived as a harm to privacy
along the European model, and what difference that might make when dealing
with the less straightforward types of child pornography cases. The majority in
Sharpe does not explicitly use the language of privacy to describe this violation
to the child's dignity rights, but Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's concurring judgment
does. She notes that " [t]he privacy interests of those children who pose for child
pornography are engaged by the fact that a permanent record of their sexual
exploitation is produced"' 6 and that, "[i]f disseminated, child pornography
involving real people immediately violates the privacy rights of those depicted,
causing them additional humiliation."'0 7
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's concurring judgment in Sharpe explicitly casts
sexual exploitation as an aspect of privacy harms, where children's privacy inter-
ests are tied to their physical and psychological integrity. This is an understanding
of privacy that is close to the European understanding of privacy rights. The
European Court of Human Rights, for instance, does not draw a distinction
between privacy violations and physical or sexual integrity violations, finding
instead that the latter can constitute the former in tfie way that a cavity search is
a privacy violation because it is a violation of physical integrity and hence human
dignity.' 8 In other words, the European approach shared by Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 sees all sexual offences as a violation of the victim's personal privacy, and
there is no coherent way to separate the privacy offence from the sexual offence.
Chief Justice McLachlin's understanding in Sharpe of the harm of sexual objec-
tification, on the other hand, is that it is degrading and hence an affront to the
victim's personhood (without reference to privacy) and consequently a violation
of the child's dignity.
A closer look at the narrow exception to child pornography possession of-
fences created by the Court in Sharpe for consensual, intimately-held photography
highlights, however, the implicit dignity-based privacy values at stake in exploita-
tive photographs, even if Chief Justice McLachlin does not explicitly identify
105. Canadian Red Cross, "What Makes Young People Vulnerable to Exploitation?" online:
<http://www.redcross.calmain.asp?id=02903 1>.
106. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 189.
107. Ibid. at para. 164.
108. Case ofX and Y supra note 7.
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them as such (hereinafter referred to as the implicit dignity-based approach to
privacy). While phrased in terms of the right to freedom of expression of teen-
agers,'" the exception Chief Justice McLachlin reads out of the child pornography
possession offence equates sexual objectification with harm'to privacy interests. She
holds that possession of sexual images of adolescents over the age of consent will
not be deemed possession of child pornography in the following circumstances:
The person possessing the recording must have personally recorded or participated
in the sexual activity in question. That activity must not be unlawful, thus ensuring
the consent of all parties, and precluding the exploitation or abuse of children. All
parties must also have consented to the creation of the record. The recording must
be kept in strict privacy by the person in possession, and intended exclusively for
private use by the creator and the persons depicted therein. 0
Two safeguards against exploitation via objectification are contained in this
exception: the requirement that both the sexual activity and the recording be
consensual and the requirement that subsequent possession and use of the re-
cording be limited to the intimate partners for their mutual pleasure (or by the
child in the case of self-photography). In other words, such photographs or videos
become subject to the provision again as soon as they are shared outside the
intimacy of the partners, which assumes that only the original intimate rela-
tionship precludes sexual objectification and exploitation."' Circulation among
non-intimate people converts the image into an instance of exploitation and so
constitutes a violation of dignity-based privacy interests.
I Subsequent interpretation of the exception has refined the intimacy re-
quirement by requiring proof that the minor subject of the sexual photo shares
pleasure in the use of that photo with the photographer. In other words, evidence
must also overcome the power differential inherent to sexual photography,
109. Freedom of expression values contain privacy components-namely, those forms of expression
that are related to individual autonomy and self-fulfillment. See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927 at para. 53.
110. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 116.
111. The United Kingdom has similarly attempted to legally define scenarios where it is possible for
teenagers to engage in sexual self-expression that is not exploitative, but more narrowly limits
the exception to minors sixteen years and older who are married or living common law in a
family relationship. Sexual OffencesAct2003 (U.K), 2003, c. 42, ss. 45(3)-(4). For a discussion,
see Yaman Akdeniz, Internet Child Pornography and the Law: National-and International
Responses (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008) at 48.
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which exposes the subject of the photograph (and not the photographer) to
potential exploitation."' The trial court re-hearing the Sharpe case subsequent
to the Supreme Court's ruling places emphasis on the mutuality required by
Chief Justice McLachlin's use of the word "and" in "private use by the creator
and the person depicted.".. In other words, the court rules that photographs
taken for the pleasure of the adult photographer alone are not eligible for the
exception since they still objectify the tminor subject. The intimate photo
exception is consequently not available if a minor is given money, drugs, or
other gifts in exchange for posing for sexual photographs, even if these pho-
tographs are not circulated to others; such photographs were not taken for
mutual benefit."'
B. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: AUTONOMY AND HARM TO CAPACITY FOR
SELF-PRESENTATION
My analysis of dignity-based harms caused to the subjects of child pornogra-
phy has thus far considered how recording and circulating images of abuse is
linked to sexual objectification. Another type of harm caused to the subjects
of child pornography concerns the subject's ability to control self-presentation.
This harm was identified by Chief Justice McLachlin in Sharpe when she
stated that "the child must live in the years that follow with the knowledge
that the degrading photo or film may still exist.""' The harm lies in the child's
fear that sexual or sexualized images will be seen by people in his or her social
environment, such that he or she loses the ability to control this highly per-
sonal information and consequently how he or she is perceived by others. In
some instances, the circulation of highly personal information may also result
in sexual or other objectification, a further affront to human dignity."' However,
this harm is not only tied to sexual objectification since victims can experience
humiliation, anxiety, shame, and fear when informed that their photographs
have been viewed by anyone, regardless of whether the viewing occurs "for a
112. R. v. Sharpe, [2002] B.C.J. No. 610 at para. 19 (S.C.) (QL).
113. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 116.
114. For Canadian case law on this matter, see supra notes 90-91.
115. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 92.
116. In a broader dignity-based approach, objectification need not be sexual to amount to an
affront to human dignity. See Julie Cohen, "Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject As Object" (2000) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 at 1424.
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sexual purpose" (e.g., when victims are informed that photographs have been
viewed by police investigators).'"7
Among the varied and overlapping theories of privacy is a strain that considers
privacy to be crucial to creating the conditions for people to be able to define
themselves."' Self-definition is generally conceived as an autonomy-based interest
whereby individuals are able to assert appropriate control over the circulation of
sensitive personal information. Some scholars, including Lisa Austin, argue that
this privacy interest is better rooted in identity than in autonomy interests, an
approach that may cast informational privacy as dignity-based."' Canada's privacy
laws, which govern the handling of personal information by governments and
businesses, and common law tort actions, such as "publication of private facts,"
tend to derive from a liberty-based approach to privacy, insofar as they are narrowly
concerned with securing consent to disclose information. But disclosure of sexual
information, especially information pertaining to a history of sexual abuse or
exploitation, weighs especially heavily on dignity-based interests, which are broader
than merely a question of whether or not the subject has consented to disclosure.
Protecting this type of dignity-based privacy justifies the availability of publication
bans on the names of sexual assault victims in court records, including children
who are the subject of child pornography images.' 20 Losing the capacity to shape
117. As Palmer, supra note 78 at 66, describes it:
The key to understanding the trauma to child victims when being informed that the images
of them have been discovered lies with the fact that they have no control whatsoever of the
disclosure process. They can't choose when to disclose, what to disclose, how to disclose and
who they want to disclose to. They are left impotent and knowing that police officers and
social workers will be aware of intimate details of what has happened to them. What they be-
lieved to be a "secret" becomes a most open secret and they are left feeling humiliation,
shame and fear.
US child pornography case law has also considered the informational privacy aspect. The US
Supreme Court found the continuing existence of the "permanent record" of a child's sexual
abuse or other sexual exploitation to implicate "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters." See Ferber, supra note 103 at 760, citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
at 599 (1977). This type of harm is also echoed in Canadian s. 8 jurisprudence regarding the
right of individuals to control a "biographical core of personal information." See R v. Plant,
[19931 3 S.C.R. 281 at para. 20.
118. Daniel J. Solove, "Conceptualizing Privacy" (2002) 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087; Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction ofPrivacy in America (New York: Random House, 2000) at
223. See also Jeffrey Rosen, "The Purposes of Privacy: A Response" (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 2117.
119. Supra note 1.
120. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 486.4(3).
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one's identity as an abuse survivor is thus a further dignity-based privacy harm
caused by the existence and circulation of exploitative images, and forms a further
aspect to Chief Justice McLachlin's implicitly dignity-based approach to privacy.
Understanding the two aspects of harm elaborated in Sharpe (the harm of
revictimization and the harm to self-presentation) is useful to clarify privacy
interests at stake in the two categories of child pornography cases that do not
involve photographic recording of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation: voyeurism
(e.g., surreptitious recording of a person nude or engaged in sexual activity) and
recontextualization cases (e.g., where a nude or sexual image is distributed to a
different audience or for a different purpose than the subject anticipated).
Returning again to the debate in the news media about body scanners, the
above analysis leads to the conclusion that subjecting a child to a body scan for
the purpose of airport security may be some form of objectification (hence the
European objections on dignity-based privacy grounds) but it is not sexual ob-
jectification and so is not captured in child pornography offences in Canada.
However, should such images be used for an illegitimate purpose (i.e., sexual
or commercial), they would amount to exploitation via sexual objectification. An
ancillary harm would then arise from the knowledge that these images are circu-
lating or may be circulating among people using them for illegitimate (i.e., sexual)
purposes. These harms are shared by children and adults alike, although the
Government of Canada has only signalled concern for children here. 121
The problem of non-consensual exchange between teenagers of consensually-
made sexual images similarly depends on understanding the dignity-based harms
underlying child pornography offences, so that circulation of intimate images
outside of the protection of intimacy subjects the individual to sexual objectifica-
tion. Cases of malicious distribution of intimate photographs (after a break-up, for
example) may also be considered a criminal variation on private law privacy actions,
such as "intrusion upon seclusion" and "publication of private facts," where
dignity-based informational privacy is more closely coupled with the dominant
dignity-based harm of sexual objectification. However, child pornography law
also formally treats cases of consensual distribution (e.g., where a minor circulates
sexual images of him or herself) as criminal exploitation of a minor,122 and the
121. Brennan, supra note 55.
122. There have been no prosecutions of minors for self-distribution of sexual images to date in
Canada. The possibility of a minor being prosecuted for these acts is mentioned in R. v.
Schultz (2008), 450 A.R. 37 at paras. 129-30 (Q.B.) [Schulz}.
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consensual aspect of the distribution continues to trouble the development of
an appropriate policy response to these cases despite the legal incapacity of minors
to consent. As discussed further in the next part, while there are legitimate
concerns here, finding an appropriate solution for non-exploitative distribution
should not compromise the broad protection of dignity-based privacy interests
currently afforded by child pornography law.
III. DEFINING ABUSIVE PHOTOGRAPHY
I use the term "abusive photography" to refer to images of real children that do
not document physical sexual abuse or other exploitation, but which nonetheless
qualify as child pornography. Because defendants in cases involving abusive
photography tend also to possess more straightforward child abuse images,
discussion of abusive photography in the cases is not crucial to the outcome,
but refines the jurisprudence.123 In some cases, variations on abusive photo-
graphic practices that do not technically qualify as child pornography are further
discussed by courts as aggravating factors at sentencing.12 Consequently, the
range of images discussed as abusive to privacy and dignity interests in Cana-
dian child pornography case law is exceptionally broad.
There are three circumstances where a photograph of a real child qualifies
as child pornography in Canada but no abuse in front of the camera is involved:
(1) voyeurism images, where a child or youth is surreptitiously photographed
with no contact or direction from the photographer, (2) where initially neutral
nude images are placed in an explicitly sexual context, and (3) where sexually
explicit or nude photographs that qualify for the intimate photo exception set out
in Sharpe become child pornography upon circulation outside the intimate
context of the original partners. The last two circumstances are both instances
of recontextualization of a photograph, and so the harms occasioned upon victims
123. See e.g. R v. C (W}, [2004] O.J. No. 5985 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) (where the offender possessed
one thousand child pornography images; one was an altered image depicting the offender
with his young niece); R. v. Jiggins, [20031 A.J. No. 462 (Ct. J.) (QL) (where the offender
possessed many images of nude children, in addition to more explicit child pornography).
124. See e.g. R. v. Vassey (2007), 298 Sask. R. 205 (Ct. J.) (where, upon sentencing, the court also
considered a collection of photos the accused had taken at girls' gymnastics events and videos
of him masturbating while wearing a female gymnastics outfit); R v. Coutu, 2007 CarswellOnt
8648 (Sup. Ct.) (WL) [Coutu] (where surreptitious videotaping of the defendant's niece and
other children in the community were aggravating factors).
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share some features. How the harm to human dignity is discussed in voyeur-
ism and recontextualization cases will be examined in turn, below.
A. VOYEURISM
A unifying feature of voyeuristic images is the surreptitious, non-consensual aspect
of the photography, capturing images of acts and states that are otherwise reserved
for the individual alone or in the company of intimates. Voyeurism has been a
criminal offence in Canada since 2005, with regard to both adult and child
victims. 125 Prior to 2005, voyeuristic images of children and youth were some-
times captured by child pornography offences, and child pornography charges
continue to be laid for voyeuristic images involving minors, rather than the lesser
charge of voyeurism.121
To justify the creation of a voyeurism offence, the Department of Justice
Canada distinguishes between the privacy violations and sexual violations that
follow from acts of voyeurism, considering these violations as parallel but different:
The harm to be addressed by a voyeurism offence can be assessed from two perspec-
tives. From a policy perspective, it can be argued that the state's interest in protecting
the privacy of individual citizens and its interest in preventing sexual exploitation of
its citizens coalesce where the breach of privacy also involves a breach of the citi-
zen's sexual or physical integrity.12 7
This justification for creating a voyeurism offence mirrors the section 8 juris-
prudence regarding strip searches that similarly conceived of bodily integrity (and
the attendant dignity interests connected to it) as broader than the concept of
125. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 162:
(1) Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes-including by mechanical
or electronic means-or makes a visual recording of a person who is in circumstances that
give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if (a) the person is in a place in which a
person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal
region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity; (b) the person is nude, is
exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit
sexual activity, and the observation or recording is done for the purpose of observing or
recording a person in such a state or engaged in such an activity; or (c) the observation or
recording is done for a sexual purpose.
126. R v. K(G.), [2007] O.J. No. 4308 (Ct. J.) (QL); R. v.JE.L (2005), 204 C.C.C. (3d) 137
(B.C. C.A.) [.EL. 2005]; R. v. H(M) (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (B.C. C.A.); R. v.
M.(D.S.), [2001] B.C.J. No. 1913 (S.C.) (QL); and R v.J (R B.) (2006), 421 AR 216 (Ct. J.).
127. Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence: A Consultation Paper (Ottawa:
Communications Branch, 2002), online: <http://www.justice.gc.calehg/cons/voy/voy.pdf>
[Justice Canada, Voyeurism].
574 (2010) 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
privacy, which is limited to regulating the degree to which an act (or information)
is made public or kept private. 128 However, the consultation process leading up to
the creation of the voyeurism offence, and some features of the voyeurism offence
as it was enacted, make the distinction between these two types of harms more
interconnected than they might appear.
The consultation paper released by Justice Canada in 2002 cites the devel-
opment of smaller and more widely accessible visual recording technologies as a
primary reason for the need to create such an offence at that time. The paper
states that "with the new technology, voyeurism itself may now involve a breach
of privacy much greater than could have been foreseen when the Code was
drafted---one that undermines basic notions of freedom and privacy found in a
democratic society." 129 Implicitly taking a dignity-based approach to privacy, the
consultation paper asserts that people have a right to live free of surreptitious
observation by not only state actors, but also by private individuals. The signifi-
cance of the extended quote in the previous paragraph is that Justice Canada
links "the state's interest in protecting the privacy of individual citizens and its
interest in preventing sexual exploitation of its citizens" in the service of democ-
ratic values. 0 The distinction between breach of privacy and breach of sexual or
physical integrity, while still discernable in these statements, is blurred through
the invocation of "basic notions of freedom and privacy."
This distinction is also tenuous in voyeurism-type child pornography cases
and becomes all the more interconnected once other troubling but not illegal
images are included in the sentencing decisions (typically dealing with non-
consensual zoom lens photography of children in public places). While the non-
consensual feature of the zoom lens photography is the same, the photographs
are not taken in circumstances that the law currently understands as inspiring a
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless privacy is understood to include a dig-
nity-based right that guards against sexual objectification more generally. The
child pornography case law dealing with voyeurism consequently elaborates
Canadian jurisprudence on the interests at stake in non-consensual photography.
These two types of voyeuristic scenarios (in private spaces and in public) will be
discussed below.
128. Part I(A), above.
129. Justice Canada, Voyeurism, supra note 127 at 1.
130. Ibid. at 8.
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1. SURREPTITIOUS PHOTOGRAPHS INVOLVING PRIVATE SPACES OR ACTS
The dominant form of voyeuristic images that qualify as child pornography
mirrors the qualifications of the separate criminal offence of voyeurism, and so
involves the surreptitious recording of a person under eighteen in a state of un-
dress or the surreptitious recording of an adolescent engaged in sexual relations.
The combination of non-consensual recording and a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the spaces and acts photographed constitute a violation of dignity
interests (coercive exposure of a person's body) as well as the related harm to
capacity for self-presentation (by enlarging the audience without the knowledge
or consent of the subject of the photograph). In such cases, Canadian courts have
been inclined to view any images revealing nude bodies of minors obtained via
surreptitious voyeuristic recording as child pornography, whether or not the
images could be considered to have as a "dominant characteristic" the depiction
of sexual organs, and whether or not the accused collected the images "for a sexual
purpose," as the. Criminal Code provision requires. In other words, Canadian
courts deem the surreptitiousness of the recording of nude bodies (i.e., changing
clothes, taking a bath, or using the washroom) to ensure that the resulting images
automatically satisfy both the "dominant characteristic" and "sexual purpose"
requirements. Surreptitiously recorded images of exposed bodies inherently
sexually objectify the subject of the photograph, and so enact a violation of pri-
vacy, irrespective of the offender's motives.
R. v. J.E.I."' serves as an example of this reasoning where surreptitious in-
trusion on a victim's solitude or intimacy amounts to sexual exploitation. In that
case, the accused took advantage of a hole in an unfinished bathroom wall of his
home and videotaped some of his daughter's teenaged friends, editing together
only the portions of the resulting footage where breasts, genitals, or buttocks
were exposed. An expert for the defence argued that the recording had not been
done "for a sexual purpose," but rather out of "idle curiosity."132 The court con-
sidered the "sexual purpose" requirement to capture a variety of violations of sexual
integrity, including "some sort of thrill over the invasion of privacy as such":133
The nature of the invasion of privacy is after all the unguarded depiction of the sexual
organs and nudity of the subject. Whether such depictions cause sexual stimulation
131. [2003] B.C.J. No. 3092 (S.C.) (QL) [.El. 2003], afPdJ.EI. 2005, supra note 126.
132. Ibid. at para. 15.
133. Ibid. at para. 20.
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in some viewers might not express quite the test in a case of this kind, which is
perhaps more accurately described as one of sexual embarrassment of the subjects. I
am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that whatever was intended by the person
making the videotapes, such depictions are for a sexual purpose within the meaning of
the section and that the harm sought to be inhibited by that section includes this ac-
tivity. The tapes are therefore child pornography within the meaning of this section.1
The offence here is grounded in harm to privacy described as "sexual embarrass-
ment of the subjects." This harm combines the broader concept of dignity with
privacy in that "sexual embarrassment" both objectifies the subject and exposes
him or her to unwanted audiences-in other words, it is the act of having one's
dignity interests publicly affronted.
TheJEI. trial decision was rendered in the course of the consultation period
leading up to the creation of the general voyeurism offence. Consequently, it may
reflect the broader scope of that offence, which also includes instances of sexual
objectification regardless of the motivations of the offender,135 where-the "physical
or sexual integrity of the victim" is compromised for other purposes, "such as to
generate visual representations for commercial sale, to harass or intimidate the
victim, or to amuse others at the victim's expense.""' The latter two motivations
presume that the victim is identifiable from the resulting images, while generating
images for commercial sale would apply even to images where a person's face or
other identifying characteristics are not in the frame.
By including images wherein the subject cannot be identified, the voyeurism
offence views sexual objectification as a collective dignity-based privacy harm.
Similar to child pornography cases dealing with voyeuristic images, the vo-
yeurism offence is not primarily about punishing the sexual proclivities of the
offender, but rather about defending against the harm enacted on the sexual
integrity of the victim in circumstances where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy and/or a high degree of harm to dignity. Although the "and/or" in
this formulation is still necessary because the Criminal Code and the case law
continue to waver on whether these types of harms are distinct and separable,
134. Ibid at paras. 20-21. Note that this type of voyeuristic, non-sexual image would not qualify as
child pornography under US law, which at the federal level requires "graphic or simulated
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person" under the age of eighteen years.
18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006).
135. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 162(1).
136. Justice Canada, Voyeurism, supra note 127 at 9.
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they are closer together here than anywhere else in Canadian law, and so reflect
Canada's implicit dignity-based approach to privacy.1 7
2. SURREPTITIOUS PHOTOGRAPHS IN PUBLIC PLACES: ZOOM LENS
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY?
The close relationship between violations of dignity and violations of reasonable
expectations of privacy informs the discussion of zoom lens photography in child.
pornography offenders' collections. Such images do not meet the legal definition
of voyeurism and are not easily classified as child pornography because of two
significant features: first, the children's bodies are clothed, and second, the chil-
dren's bodies are photographed iri public places (such as beaches or pools), where
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy as commonly understood by the law.
The question therefore becomes whether and to what degree dignity-based pri-
vacy harms are caused by such images.
In R. v. Neilly,138 discussion of the harm of sexual objectification in Sharpe
is implicitly extended to photographs of children in bathing suits taken with a
zoom lens. The offender was found to have an extensive collection of photo-
graphs straightforwardly qualifying as child pornography, but his sentence of a
one-year custodial term also found a basis in the more than five hundred images
focusing on the genital and buttock areas of young girls (albeit covered by their
bathing suits) that he had taken in public swimming areas.' The Crown submit-
ted these photographs as evidence that the accused made "an active effort to find
little girls and collect repugnant material.""' The more passive activity of viewing
sexually explicit images of unnamed children colours the active photography of
easily identifiable local girls, making the resulting images part of the spectrum of
images the accused possessed "for a sexual purpose." By accepting this evidence,
the trial court in Neilly considered sexual objectification to be a privacy violation
that inheres where there is a social expectation of privacy in the personal space
137. In Coutu, the court addresses dignity-based privacy harms caused by surreptitious recording of
children: "[e]ven though it was unbeknownst to them, it was a violation of their privacy and
personal integrity." Supra note 124 at para. 19.
138. [2005] O.J. No. 5973 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) [Neilly].
139. The sentence was upheld on appeal. The court referred to "the fact that [the defendant] went
into the community and surreptitiously made sexually-explicit photographs of young girls." R.
v. Neilly (2006), 209 O.A.C. 155 at para. 4 [emphasis added].
140. Neilly, supra note 138 at para. 20.
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around a person's body, and hence a proximity and focus that strangers are not
socially condoned to breach."' The court considered the images harmful enough
to order the exhibit containing them sealed. 142
The court in Neilly did not discuss whether images of the clothed genital and
buttock regions of children would independently qualify as child pornography,
as this determination was not necessary to consider such photographic practices
to be an aggravating factor. In the United States, this issue is extensively explored
in United States v. Knox," although in that case girls were posed and directed to
perform for the camera rather than being surreptitiously recorded in a public
place. The Knox case determined that zooming in on the genital areas, even where
covered by underwear or a bathing suit, of a young girl posing provocatively for
the camera amounts to lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
minor, which is prohibited by US law. The reasoning addresses the nature of the
images themselves, rather than the harm of such intrusive photography on the
girls.'4 4 The Canadian Neilly case, on the other hand, approached the zoom lens
images from the perspective of the dignity-based privacy harm to the subjects of
the photographs, considered in the context of the accused's collection of sexual
photographs as a whole.
Although the Aubry case presented the possibility that non-consensual pho-
tography, in general, results in both dignity and autonomy rights violations (at
least in Quebec, with its stronger European privacy orientation), voyeurism-
that is, non-consensual photography featuring sexual objectification-clearly
141. Similar concerns about the function of technologies that enable widespread privacy invasion
involving sexual objectification in public places arises in legislation addressing "up-skirt"
photography-use of a hidden camera located in a shoe or bag to take photographs up women's
skirts-in the United States. A federal up-skirt offence was created by the Video Voyeurism
Prevention Act of2004, which provides that a reasonable expectation of privacy includes
"circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the individual
would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private
place." 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
142. The court in Neilly, supra note 138, also implicitly refers to the second type of privacy harm
set out in Sharpe, supra note 20: namely, living with the knowledge that such images exist and
may be in circulation even though that knowledge is only potential in this case since the girls
did not know they were being photographed. See Neilly at para. 92.
143. 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994) [Knox].
144. The Knox court does note, however, that "[t]he films themselves and the promotional brochures
... demonstrate that the videotapes clearly were designed to pander to pedophiles." Ibid at 737.
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involves closely overlapping autonomy- and dignity-based affronts such that lack
of consent, while surely an aggravating factor, is not the only source of harm.
Further, the identifiability of the subjects of such photographs, while also an
aggravating factor, is not determinative of harm either, making such actions
affronts to collective dignity-based privacy interests in Canada as well.' Al-
though the dignity-based approach to privacy is not as broad in Canada as it is
in Europe generally, it is evident in prohibitions against voyeurism.
B. RECONTEXTUALIZED IMAGES
The second major category of images that, notwithstanding that they do not
document physical acts of sexual abuse, nonetheless qualify as child pornography
are images that have been recontextualized in one of two ways: first, nude images,
typically of young children, which only become child pornography upon being
placed within a sexualized context, and second, nude or sexual images of ado-
lescents that initially qualify for the intimate photography exception but which
become child pornography upon circulation outside of the original intimate
context. There are significant differences between these two types of recontex-
tualization cases; however, drawing a parallel between them on the basis of the
harm caused by a shift in audience.helps elucidate the Canadian approach to
these harms.
1. "INNOCENT" NUDES PLACED IN AN EXPLICITLY SEXUAL CONTEXT
In the United States, some nude photographs of children qualify as child
pornography depending on the nature of the image and regardless of context.'
In contrast, Chief Justice McLachlin in Sharpe considers the "for a sexual pur-
pose" requirement as a major part of what determines the legal classification of
a photograph:
Family photos of naked children, viewed objectively, generally do not have as their
"dominant characteristic" the depiction of a sexual organ or anal region "for a sexual
purpose." Placing a photo in an album of sexual photos and adding a sexual caption
145. An identifiability requirement in some of the US up-skirt statutes has been criticized by some
observers. See e.g. Lance E. Rothenberg, Note, "Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video
Voyeurs, and Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the
Public Space" (2000) 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 1127.
146. This determination is not as simple as it sounds. See Amy Adler, "The Perverse Law of Child
Pornography" (2001) 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209 at 241.
580 (20101 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
could change its meaning such that its dominant characteristic or purpose becomes
unmistakably sexual in the view of a reasonable objective observer.'14
This short passage establishes an exception for "family photos of naked children"
in a specifically Canadian way: namely, that the "dominant characteristic" and
"sexual purpose" requirements are dependent on context, and that contextual
meaning determines whether or not harm has been caused to the child who is
pictured. In the phrase "family photo," Chief Justice McLachlin no doubt ide-
alizes the family to mean the non-sexual circle of care-suppressing the reality
that most sexual abuse occurs within family relationships-but her aim is clearly
to distinguish between a photo in a non-abusive family photo collection and one
in an abusive collection (which may be created by a family member)." Harm to
the child pictured in such photographs occurs subsequent to when the photo-
graph was taken, upon the sexual objectification of the child's image.
At least one Canadian case, R. v. Nedelec,'" has applied Chief Justice
McLachlin's reasons to a situation involving a found family photograph (i.e.,
where it is not a family member who his placed the photo in a sexual context).
Because the accused also possessed photographs that more straightforwardly
qualified as child pornography, discussion of this particular photograph was not
necessary to secure conviction. Instead, the discussion serves merely to elaborate
the dignity-based harm of sexually recontextualizing such photographs. The
photograph depicted a three- or four-year-old girl, who was not known to the
accused, sitting on the floor opening a Christmas present with her nightgown
hitched up and no underwear on. The defendant claimed that he had found the
image in an envelope at a garbage dump and that he did not possess it for a sexual
purpose, but rather merely as a collector of varied things, including photographs.
Since he had placed this photo in an album containing more explicit sexual
147. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 51.
148. Indeed, most child pornography production takes place in the course of sexual abuse within
families. See e.g. R v. CP., [2008] N.B.J. No. 390 (C.A.) (QL); R. v. M(L.), [2008] 2 S.C.R.
163; R. v. M (.A.) (2007), 295 Sask. R. 150 (Ct. J.); R. v. F. (1.), 2006 CarswellOnt 5575
(Sup. Ct.) (WL); R. v. J (R.B.) (2006), 421 A.R. 216 (Ct. J.); R. v. P. (G.E) (2004), 229
N.S.R. (2d) 61 (C.A.); R. v. W (R.), [2001] O.J. No. 2810 (Sup. Ct.) (QL); R. v. M. (B.C)
(2008), 238 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. E (R. W) (2007), 86 O.R. (3d) 493 (C.A.);
R. v. B. (A.), [2006] O.J. No. 2543 (Sup. Ct.) (QL); R. v. L. (A.F.), 2005 CarswellAlta 1968
(Ct. J.) (WL); R. v. S. (VP.), [2001] B.C.J. No. 930 (S.C.) (QL); R v. B. (TL.) (2007), 404
A.R. 283 (C.A.); and R. v. W (L.A.) (2006), 290 Sask. R. 43 (Ct. J.).
149. [2001] B.C.J. No. 2243 (S.C.) (QL) [Nedelec].
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images, the court found that he possessed the photo for a sexual purpose, which
converted it into child pornography.'
Since context does not figure into the determination of whether an image is
exploitative and meets the legal definition of child pornography in the United
States, the Americans have more contentious examples of non-abusing family
members being charged with child pornography offences for baby-in-the-bath-
type photographs. The Canadian approach benefits by understanding harm to
be determined by context, although misapplication of child pornography offences
is certainly possible in Canada, too. Nonetheless, in Canadian jurisprudence, it
follows that a nude image could violate child pornography law if it is circulated
outside the non-abuosive family's circle of care, but not if it remains within that
circle of care.'
Another scenario that highlights the contrast between dignity- and liberty-
based approaches to privacy concerns arises where images published in a non-
pornographic context are subsequently republished in an explicitly pornographic
context. In the United States, republication in a pornographic context does not
change the status of the nude photo of a child, since an image either attracts First
Amendment protection (and hence is not child pornography) or it does not.152
Efforts to litigate such cases as violations of privacy at private law have also been
unsuccessful in the United States,' whereas European law affords ongoing privacy
150. Ibid. at para. 49.
151. In the media coverage of the recent case from Arizona (Przygoda, supra note 96), the
defendant's lawyer curiously appears to follow the Canadian rather than US approach:
ABC News was able to obtain access to four of the photos. There are still nine other photo-
graphs which were not released because the Demarees' lawyer said that the photos were in-
tended for private home use and showing them to outside parties would violate the law for
distribution of child pornography.
152. In the United States, to qualify as child pornography the images in question must portray
"sexually explicit conduct," which means actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v)
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)
(2006). The case law has elaborated what content is captured by "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area," but this content is not affected by context. Knox, supra note 143.
153. Actress Brooke Shields initially won an injunction based on breach of contract against a
photographer who had republished nude photos of her at age ten in an adult magazine. See
Shields v. Gross, 451 N.Y.S.2d 419 (App. Div. 1982). The state's Court of Appeals, however,
vacated the injunction and ruled against Shields. See Shields v. Gross, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254
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rights to the subject of a nude photograph (adults as well as children), even after
it has been published.'14 While no Canadian cases have yet explored this scenario,
non-exploitative nude photographs of children initially published in art or edu-
cational publications may be sheltered by the "legitimate purpose" defence, and
it is likely that the same photographs would lose the shelter of this defence if they
were republished in an explicitly pornographic publication. The reasoning is
similar to the family photograph exception, in that the context determines whether
the subject of the photo has been sexually objectified, thereby suffering from
the attendant harms to dignity-based privacy. Further, in a dignity-based ap-
proach, harm to capacity for self-presentation is also not dependent on the
secrecy of the information, but instead can be affected by the context in which
that information acquires meaning. In other words, the privacy harms inflicted
on the child subject by the context of the photo determines its criminal status,
and so protection of these interests cannot be lost merely by previous publica-
tion or by blanket consents to photographers, as they are in the United States.'
Canada is similar to Europe on this point, although in Europe it is not just
a minor but any person who does not lose dignity-based privacy interests in a
nude photograph-even after an image has been published in a particular context,
and even where that person has a highly sexualized public persona.1s' While
Canada is clearly closer to the European approach when it comes to images of
nude children, it is not clear how useful Canadian law would be to seek redress
for privacy violations for recontextualized nude or sexual images of adults, or
where the images do not depict a person nude. Proposed changes to copyright
legislation, for instance, appear to privilege copyright over privacy interests such
(N.Y. 1983). Shields then brought an action in federal court for invasion of privacy and sought
a further injunction that was rejected. See Shields (Litigation guardian of) v. Gross, 563 F. Supp.
1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Another federal court reached a similar conclusion in a Texas case
dealing with nude photos of children initially published in an educational text on sexuality and
republished in an adult magazine. See Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 1341
(N.D. Tex. 1985).
154. Whitman, supra note 5 at 1198.
155. Austin, supra note 1. Adult non-consensual publication orrepublication of private photos is an
underdeveloped area of law in Canada. For a discussion of several Australian cases, see David
Rolph, "Dirty Pictures: Defamation, Reputation and Nudity" (2006) 10 Law Text Culture 101.
156. Whitman, supra note 5 at 1199, citing C.A. Versailles, 8 June 2000, S.A. Mulhimania Prod
c. Madame L., No. 859, 126me ch.; Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 29 May 2002, S.A. SPPI c. Socidti
Fox Midia, No. R6: 01/04400, 3 me ch.
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that a person hiring a photographer for a private event or sitting would auto-
matically alienate his rights in an image of himself (and other people at a private
event) by default."s' Canada thus cannot be said to have one coherent approach
to privacy. Understanding this inconsistency might help clarify the specific ways
that the next category of images-distribution of private sexual photos of and by
teenagers-causes so much conceptual difficulty, especially when Canadians fail
to distinguish the Canadian legal context from US debates regarding similar cases
in the United States. .
2. CIRCULATED CONSENSUAL IMAGES
The final category of images that do not depict physical acts of sexual abuse but
may qualify as child pornography arises when a photograph taken in a private,
presumptively non-exploitative context becomes problematic upon distribution
outside of that original context: namely, consensual photographs of consensual
sex between persons legally capable of consent.' This category by definition
concerns sexual photographs of teenagers under the age of eighteen, but over the
age of consent (which may range from twelve to sixteen, depending on the age
of the partner)."' The photographer may be the teenager photographed, another
teenager, or an adult.
In its most straightforward interpretation, the exception applies to minors
taking photographs of themselves for their own exclusive enjoyment and to their
157. Bill C-32, An Act to amend the CopyrightAct, 3d Sess., 40th Parl., 2010, ss. 6, 38 (1st reading
2 June 2010). In particular, the law would change the current scheme (wherein copyright in
a commissioned photograph rests with the person who commissioned and paid for it) so that
copyright would always rest with the photographer unless contractually transferred. Private
individuals who have commissioned work (e.g., hiring a wedding photographer) would be
exempt from copyright infringement for private use of the photographs, but the proposed
changes do not in any way restrict the way in which a photographer can use such a photograph,
even if it was taken at a private function or sitting (e.g., "boudoir photography" intended as a
gift from one intimate partner to another).
158. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 116. The application of the exceptions to both possessing and
making child pornography offences is at para. 128.
159. The general age of consent in Canada is sixteen, but close-in-age exceptions permit sexual
relations in two cases: between twelve- and thirteen-year-olds and a partner less than two years
older, and between fourteen- and fifteen-year olds and a partner less than five years older-in
both cases provided that the partner is not in a position of trust. Until I May 2008, the age of
consent in Canada was fourteen (except in trust relationships), so at the time of the Sharpe
decision the general age of consent was fourteen. Criminal Code, supra note 69, s. 150.1. -
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legal sexual partners taking photographs of their sexual encounters for their
mutual and exclusive enjoyment.' Chief Justice McLachlin is very clear that
these photographs qualify as child pornography as soon as they are circulated
outside of this limited personal or intimate context:
I reiterate that the protection afforded by this exception would extend no further
than to materials intended solely for private use. If materials were shown to be held
with any intention other than for personal use, their possession would then fall out-
side the exception's aegis and be subject to the full force of s. 163.1(4). Indeed such
possession might also run afoul of the manufacturing and distributing offences set
out in ss. 163.1(2) and 163.1(3)."61
The key difference between the photographs subject to this exception and the
"family photo" exception is that here the photographs are explicitly sexual,
increasing the sensitivity of their content. Moreover, exchanging sexual photo-
graphs appears to have increased as a regular social practice between sexual or
romantic partners due to the centrality that digital technologies have assumed
in children's evolving social practices (be they positive or negative).162 Tension
consequently arises at the prospect of potentially prosecuting many teenagers
for distributing child pornography where the photo subjects are peers who were
willing participants in the photography. The potential for such prosecutions has
led to calls for a more appropriate policy response." 3
In order to explore how Canadian law frames dignity-based privacy harms
caused by circulation of such photos, I will analyze cases of malicious circulation
of images separately from situations where photographs are not maliciously
circulated. In the first category, there is limited reported Canadian case law; in
160. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 128.
161. Ibid. at para. 118.
162. "Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults" The National Campaign
to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy & COSMOgirl.com (10 December 2008), online:
<http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech Summary.pdf>.
163. Many US states have introduced bills to address "sexting" as something other than child
pornography or as a special case of child pornography requiring different treatment. As one
news report on a bill introduced in Kentucky noted, "Legislation regarding sexting was
introduced in at least 11 states in 2009, with six passing the bills, according to the National
Conference of State Legislatures. The bills were a mix of increased penalties, decreased penalties
and the creation of educational programs about the dangers of sexting." Andrew Thomason,
"Bill Targets Youth Who Send 'Sexts'" The [Bowling Green] Daily News (9 January 2010),
online: <http://bgdailynews.com/articles/2010/01/10/news/news3.ixt>.
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the second category, there is no reported case law. Police in Canada have not yet
pursued child pornography charges where youth have non-maliciously distributed
consensually taken sexual photos of other youth,'" and none of the reported cases
involving malicious distribution deal with a young offender."' Instead, peer
situations aire typically addressed outside of the criminal justice system or through
diversion, and so jurisprudence concerning consensual exchange between teenagers
of sexual photos is largely hypothetical.'" While an offender's motive for dis-
tributing a consensually-made sexual photo of a minor is irrelevant to determining
whether a child pornography offence has been committed, motive has clearly
been influential in discretionary decisions about whether to lay charges and pursue
prosecution. Further, motive in these types of situations might signal reduction or
elimination of the dignity-based privacy harms to the subjects of the photographs,
and so an exploration of what Canadian courts have said about the privacy and
dignity harms caused by circulating such photos will potentially help to chart a
more consistent course when these cases arise.
The classic scenario involving malicious circulation arises where a jilted
boyfriend intentionally circulates a sexual photo of his ex-girlfriend among
their peers, families, or the public at large in order to humiliate her, but claims to
be unaware that he is committing a child pornography offence (frequently, the
164. There is at least one unreported case concerning non-malicious distribution, where an eighteen-
year-old male was ultimately convicted of corrupting morals rather than distributing child
pornography. See Schultz, supra note 122 at para. 102, citing R. v. TM.M, (1 October 2007)
070356779PI (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
165. R. v. Walsh (2006), 206 C.C.C. (3d) 543 (Ont. C.A.) [Walsh 2006]; R. v. Dabrowski (2007),
86 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.) [Dabrowski); and Schultz, ibid.
166. Interview of Roberta Sinclair, Manager of Research and Development of the National Child
Exploitation Coordination Centre (29 October 2008). Sinclair indicated that peer-on-peer
exploitation of this sort was generally being handled through alternative channels at the local
level, and that a concerted policy response was still being worked out. See also Andrea Slane,
Child Sexual Exploitation, Technology and Crime Prevention Education: Keeping Pace with the
Risks? (Report prepared for Public Safety Canada, 19 August 2009) [unpublished], online:
<http://socialscienceandhumanities.uoit.calassets/assers/documents/Slane_-_Keeping-Pace-
Report August_19_2009_FINAL2.pdf>. In Schultz, an Alberta court considered the
hypothetical case of a young teenager deliberately circulating sexual images of herself, but only
with regard to whether applying a mandatory minimum sentence for child pornography
offences in such a circumstance would offend s. 12 of the Charter. The court concluded that
imposing the mandatory minimum sentence on youth who circulated sexual images of
themselves would not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, due to the indirect harms to
other children that child pornography also occasions. Schulb, supra note 122 at paras. 129-30.
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partner insists that what he has done is not, or should not be, a child pornography
violation)." 7 The three reported Canadian cases addressing malicious distribution
uniformly follow the conceptual framework set out in Sharpe, where circulation
of images outside of this cocoon of intimacy and mutuality reintroduces the
likelihood of sexual objectification and its attendant harm to dignity-based
privacy interests.'
The dignity basis of the harm caused by disseminating such photographs
justified findings of guilt in all three reported cases. In R. v. Walsh,'69 a twenty-
three-year-old man distributed sexual photographs of his fifteen-year-old former
girlfriend to at least one friend, leading to further distribution to her school com-
munity and family. In R v. Schultz,'70 a twenty-year-old offender repeatedly ex-
posed intimate photographs of his sixteen-year-old former girlfriend to public
view on various websites, calling attention to her age and how to locate her. Finally,
in R. v. Dabrowski,"'7 even threats to expose intimate videos to public view viti-
ated the "private use" exception, since such threats implied that these materials
were no longer being held for a mutual intimate purpose. From these cases, one
can conclude that the exception is very narrow and is strictly limited to making
and possessing photographs as part of an intimate relationship.172
Similar to the family photos exception, recontextualization into a non-intimate
context changes the meaning of the photograph from a presumption of intimate
connection to sexual objectification. Consequently, the courts again interpret the
"for a sexual purpose" requirement broadly, so that criminal liability attaches
whenever a person breaches the intimate context for any purpose other than a
167. Walsh 2006, supra note 165 at para. 35; Schultz, ibid. at paras. 19, 61, 71.
168. Sharpe, supra note 20 at para. 116. Exceptions to this presumption were not considered, but
might include situations where the teenaged subject of a sexual photo privately shares a photo
he or she has taken with an intimate partner, or privately shares a photo taken within a previous
relationship with a subsequent intimate partner.
169. Supra note 165 at paras. 6-7.
170. Supra note 122 at paras. 2-11.
171. Dabrowski, supra note 165 at paras. 24-27.
172. The secondary harm to informational privacy, namely the non-consensual dissemination of
information about how the adolescent behaves in intimate circumstances (including what he
or she looks like in intimate poses), could be inferred from the facts of these cases, but is not
discussed by the courts. Recalling such private law actions as the US tort of "publication of
private facts," circulation of sexual images meant for an intimate context impair the photo subject's
capacity to define his or herself in a variety of social contexts (e.g., family, school, et cetera).
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respectful, dignity-preserving connection. As the court states with regard to the
defendant Walsh:
In the present matter, it seems that the production and distribution of the child
pornography involved a desire to humiliate and embarrass and perhaps to ruin the
life of the victim. ... [T]he creation and distribution were clearly done for a form of
gratification by Mr. Walsh.
I am unable to discern the nature of that gratification. I have heard of things like
revenge. I have heard of things like a desire to make the victim hurt like he felt he
was hurting because she ended the relationship, and there may be other aspects of
gratification which are not evident in this matter, but nonetheless this matter falls
within a form of gratification by distribution of what happens to be, in the circum-
stance in which it occurred, the production and distribution of child pornography. 73
In this case (and in Schultz) the offence was understood to redress the deliberate,
hurtful sexual objectification of the teenaged victim."' The desire to humiliate,
embarrass, or otherwise expose the victim to harm by offering her body and sexual
behaviours to the view of others undoubtedly affected her dignity-based privacy
interests by treating her as a degraded sexual object rather than respecting her as
a person.
Cases of malicious distribution fit most easily within the existing conception
of harm set out in the child pornography jurisprudence, but the problem of the
law's response to adolescent social immaturity appears at the margins of these
cases. In Walsh, for instance, police discretion to charge some individuals and not
others is apparent, insofar as the account of events leading up to the defendant's
arrest implicates quite a few of the victim's classmates, only two of whom appear
to have been in some way engaged by the criminal justice system."' And yet all
of the teenagers who passed on the collage of images no doubt treated the victim
as a sexual object and satisfied the technical requirements of child pornography
173. Walsh 2006, supra note 165 at para. 23, citing . v. Cheyne, 2004 CarswellOnt 8872 at paras.
78-80 (Ct. J.) (WL). Two other actors in the Walsh events were also prosecuted. The first
co-accused, Simon Cheyne, had printed the collage of sexual pictures and put a copy in the
victim's locker at school. He pleaded guilty alongside Lee Walsh. See R. v. Cheype, 2004
CarswellOnt 8871 (Ct. J.) (WL). In the course of the guilty plea of the two men, the Crown
indicated that one other person had been charged: Sarah Short, who had distributed the collage
by email to several people (including the victim's father) after having a falling out with the
victim. Short's case appears to have been resolved by other means.
174. See Schultz, supra note 122 at paras. 45-46, 88.
175. Supra note 165 at paras. 6-7.
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offences. Consequently, decisions not to charge any of the other youth involved
in redistributing the pictures must have been due to other considerations, not
whether the elements of the offence were met.
From the limited case law, it appears that prosecutions are only fully pursued
in Canada where the accused was a legal adult and where he acted maliciously
and did not show remorse-in other words, where sexual exploitation of a younger
person was intentionally carried out by someone who is old enough to know
better."' This unofficial, discretionary response explains why there are currently
no reported cases of non-malicious distribution (i.e., a youth sending a sexual
photo of him or herself to his or her current intimate partner; youths deliber-
ately circulating sexual images of themselves publicly; or a youth showing another
youth a sexual photo ancillary to bragging about his or her intimate partners,
rather than to humiliate them)."' While it would preserve the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Sharpe to interpret the intimate photo exception to capture private
sexual photo exchange via technology (provided it is between intimate partners
and for the purpose of mutual enjoyment), the scenarios featuring wider non-
malicious distribution are difficult to reconcile with the Court's reasoning."'
176. However, even in these cases judges have acknowledged that public distribution of intimate
photos is less egregious than some other behaviours that constitute child pornography
offences-a consideration that is not relevant to guilt, but can be taken into account in relation
to bail, sentencing, and parole conditions. See R. v. Walsh (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 38 (C.A.)
[Walsh 2005]. The decision involves a hearing on parole conditions, where the events are
characterized as "not the more typical situation where an offender is using the Internet as a
business or a hobby to view or distribute child pornography." Feldman J.A. further commented
that "[t]his was a one time, immature and very unfortunate response to a personal life event"
(at para. 12). For discussion of this comment, see Schultz, supra note 122 at para. 119.
177. The National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre, in its 2005 environmental scan of
online sexual exploitation of children and youth, identifies "self-exploitation" as an area of
concern that requires some policy direction. To view the executive summary of this report,
see National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre, Internet Based Sexual Exploitation of
Children and Youth Environmental Scan by Roberta Sinclair & Daniel Sugar (Ottawa: NCECC
Strategic and Operations Support Services, 2005), online: <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.cal
ncecc-cncee/factsheets-fichesdocu/enviroscan-analyseenviro-eng.htm>.
178. Interpretive problems with the intimate photo exception include that a sexual photograph
that a minor takes of him or herself cannot legally be sent to his or her intimate partner.
However, it would be within the spirit of the exception for a person to send to an intimate
partner a photo of him or herself that he or she (or even a previous intimate partner) took, so
long as the photo is being used as part of a non-exploitative intimate relationship.
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This difficulty derives primarily from the Court's categorical assumption
that any circulation outside an active intimate partnership necessarily amounts
to sexual exploitation and so causes the attendant dignity-based privacy harms.
In the Court's view, there is no possibility that a more publicly circulated sexual
photo can be viewed as either legitimate sexual expression by the subject or
admiring of and not degrading to the subject."' Further, even where a youth is
quite confident in the non-exploitative nature of her sexual expression, the
Court deems anyone who circulates sexual images of children to contribute to
the indirect harms to children in general, such as encouraging cognitive dis-
tortions among predatory adults that underage youth are appropriate sexual
partners. Yet despite the Court's clear inclusion of even non-malicious distribu-
tion of sexual images of youth in child pornography offences, no prosecutions have
gone forward for non-malicious distribution. Law enforcement agencies clearly
operate on some sense that pursuing child pornography charges in such cases is
out of step with the offender's actions.'"
In order to address this discomfort, some US states have proposed alternative,
lesser offences for minors who exchange sexual images non-maliciously;1'8 other
179. Lara Karaian has argued that youth should be empowered not only to say "no" to sex, but
also to say "yes" in appropriate circumstances. She sees lack of access to positive sexual
expression as part of the trouble with the law's approach to non-malicious sexual image
exchange ("sexting"). Lara Karaian, "Lolita Speaks: Girls, 'Sexting' and the Law" (Revised
draft of paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and Society
Association, 4 June 2010) [unpublished, on file with the author].
180. Public sentiment toward these incidents tends to limit the scope of harm to the specific people
involved. In the United States, where charges have sometimes been laid for non-malicious
distribution, media coverage of the controversy over charging such youth is common. See e.g.
"Father of Teen 'Sexter': My Child's Not a Sex Offender" MyNorthwestcom (3 February 2010),
online: <http://www.mynorthwest.com/?sid=279116&nid=1 1>; Maryclaire Dale, "US Court
on 'Sexting': Child Porn or Child's Play?" The Associated Press (15 January 2010), online:
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9570752>; "'Sexting' Shockingly Common Among
Teens" CBS News & Associated Press (15 January 2009), online: <http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2009/01/15/national/main4723161.shtml>; and "Teen Faces Charges for her Own Nude
Photos: Public Defender is Disputing the Child Pornography Charges" ABC News (14 October
2008),*online: <http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerlndex?id=6034996>.
181. One example is an Ohio bill that would make "reckless" creation, exchange, and possession
of nude images of minors between minors via a telecommunications device a misdemeanour.
Felony charges could still apply for cases where there was malicious intent. U.S., H.B. 132, A
bill to enact section 2907324 of the Revised Code to prohibit a minor, by use ofa telecommunications
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states have created exceptions to mandatory sentencing or mandatory sex offender
registration for distribution by young offenders.1 2 The option of creating a lesser
offence provides prosecutors more flexibility, so that the gross inconsistencies of
the current all-or-nothing discretionary options can be better mitigated.'" I have
advocated elsewhere for a distinct criminal offence of invasion of privacy as an
alternative in situations involving peer circulation of sexual photos, provided that
this offence does not imply that similar-aged people cannot exploit one another,
and provided further that the lesser offence preserves harm to dignity-based
privacy as its underlying rationale.'" The rationale for creating lesser offences,
imposing less severe punishments, or even not imposing any criminal sanction
in some situations should clearly derive from considerations of the specific cir-
cumstances and appropriate responses thereto, and should not undermine the
validity of claims to harm experienced by victims more broadly.
IV. CONCLUSION .
My analysis of Canadian jurisprudence on dignity-based privacy interests unpacks
the ambiguities revealed in news media attempts to set out the privacy interests
protected by child pornography law. If viewed from a dignity-based perspective,
device, from recklessly creating, receiving, exchanging, sending, or possessing a photograph or other
material showing a minor in a state ofnudity, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., Ohio, 2009.
182. See e.g. U.S., S.B. 125, An Act Relating to Expanding the Sex Offender Registry, 2009-2010,
Reg. Sess., Vt., 2009 (enacted).
183. Closer examination of the role played by police and prosecutorial discretion in these cases is
beyond the scope of this article. For further discussion on this point, see e.g. Anna Pratt &
Lorne Sossin, "A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion" (2009) 24 C.J.L.S. 301.
The US exercise of discretion has been criticized because in some cases it results in no
punishment for egregiously malicious exchange of intimate photographs among peers, while
in other cases fairly harmless actions are punished too harshly.. Creating an option between child
pornography charges and no charges at all may be a fitting solution that will reduce the
conundrum such cases currently cause for those having to exercise such discretion.
184. Slane, "Sexting," supra note 19. Any doubt that peers cannot exploit one another by exchanging
sexual images should be dispelled by recent reports that a sixteen-year-old boy took photographs
and videotaped the gang rape of a sixteen-year-old girl who had been drugged at a rave party
in Pit Meadows, British Columbia and posted the images on a social networking site. Efforts
to remove the images from circulation have been futile, as they have been reposted and widely
circulated among local teenagers. See "Police Can't Block Facebook Rape Images" CBCNews
(16 September 2010), online: <http://www.cbc.calcanadalbrirish-columbialstory/2010/09/16/
bc-facebook-rave-rape.html>.
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airport body scanners do not pose different privacy threats to children than they
do to adults: children and adults both have the same dignity-based interest in
avoiding exposure of private body parts and in limiting the purpose for and
context in which the resulting images are viewed. However, minors are currently
entitled to greater protection than adults against violations of dignity-based
privacy, especially with regard to harm caused by the recontextualization of nude
photographs. Consequently, the policy decision to exclude minors from the scans
may address the risk of images being used for anything other than legitimate
security purposes. But if that risk exists for children, then it should be addressed
vis-t-vis adults as well.
The transport minister's statement that minors were excluded because they
could not consent to the scans, however, confuses the issue because it only makes
sense if the images produced by body scanners inherently qualify as child pornog-
raphy. Such a conclusion does not account for the current legitimate purpose and
no undue risk of exploitation defences, nor for the interpretations of the scope of
the law set out in Sharpe. Instead, it seems to assume that any form of objectifi-
cation of the nude body of a child is problematic-a potentially (if unintentionally)
dignity-based approach'" 5 -while at the same time sticking to a liberty-based ap-
proach that centres only on consent. A more coherent approach would honour
the dignity-based privacy interests of both children and adults by ensuring greater
safeguards against misuse and providing alternative, less intrusive means of security
screening to everyone.
The second issue-the proper treatment of youth wlso exchange sexual
photographs of themselves or each other-is far more complicated, as evidenced
by the common exercise of discretion employed to manage the "lack of fit be-
tween legal rhetoric and reality" in these cases.'" While there are a variety of
legitimate reasons to pursue alternative measures to address these situations where
the punishments seem to outweigh the crimes, I have argued that any alternative
measures should not undermine the, at least implicit, dignity-based approach to
bodily privacy that has emerged in the child pornography case law. Instead, a
185. The government may, of course, be approaching the images from a more socially conservative-
that is, prudish-perspective that sees all nudes as sexual, rather than from a human rights
angle that aims to protect all images of the body against objectification and exploitation.
186. Pratt & Sossin, supra note 183 at 304 (summarizing the contribution of Doreen McBarnet
to the study of discretion). See Doreen J. McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the
Construction oflustice (London: Macmillan, 1981).
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lesser criminal offence of invasion of privacy should not be considered a different
type of offence, but rather one that shares with child pornography offences the
aim of protecting the subjects of sexual photographs from sexual exploitation.
Invasion of privacy is also inherent to child pornography offences, and creating
a lesser charge would provide police and prosecutors with another discretionary
option to address the specifically interpersonal nature of peer exchange of sexual
images without having to invoke child pornography charges.
In particular, I am concerned that adolescents should not lose the more ro-
bust dignity-based protections they are currently afforded by child pornography
law. An alternative regime that focused more on autonomy would lead to young
people who consent to being- photographed suffering a reduced expectation of
privacy in the resulting images. I consider this the subtext of some of the me-
dia coverage highlighting arguments that would remove sexting from the pur-
view of child pornography without providing a means to distinguish harmful
acts within now common, technology-aided sexual practices. Though I agree
that the non-exploitative exchange of sexual images should not be prosecuted as
child pornography, I encourage the creation of a lesser offence of invasion of
privacy that might apply, as voyeurism does, to both adults and children. This
would protect the ongoing dignity-based privacy interests everyone should en-
joy in sexual photographs meant for an intimate audience. Such a move
would also preserve the parallel autonomy-based approach to adult sexual im-
agery (which permits adults to consent to publicize their own sexual imagery)
but would not consider consent to sexual photography in one limited context
as an overall reduction in one's legally enforceable expectations of dignity-
based privacy.
Robert C. Post has theorized that the harms of privacy violations that stem
from dignity interests are intuitively powerful because they arise from a "rupture
of significant normative expectations," where "[i]nfringements of these norms are
experienced as intrinsically harmful, because they are violative of the self.""'
Post's notion of the integrity of the self is fundamentally intersubjective: the self
is embedded in a social fabric where all members of the community owe one
another a basic level of respect. Non-consensual circulation of nude or intimate
photographs suffers from an in-between orientation because Canadian legal cul-
ture considers a person's dignity to be seriously harmed by non-consensual nude
187. "Three Concepts of Privacy" (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 2087 at 2092.
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photography (voyeurism), but appears willing to concede non-consensual public
circulation of an intimate photograph as the price an adult pays for having par-
ticipated in such photography. Canada is in a better position to resist this result
than the United States, where the alienability of adult privacy and of dignity
rights to one's image is more wholesale.
In short, Canadian child pornography jurisprudence is quietly developing a
framework for understanding the dignity-based privacy rights of the subject of
photographs that may influence the development of broader privacy rights in
photographs in Canada. Some aspects of the harms caused by child pornography
offences are closely connected to the age of the victims (e.g., their enhanced
vulnerability to exploitation); other aspects of the privacy harms suffered by the
subjects of photographs would be experienced by anyone. Specifically, the privacy
rights articulated in the child pornography case law should have implications for
adult privacy rights in relation to non-consensual circulation of nude photographs
(including those produced by a body scanner) and of sexual photographs meant
for an intimate audience. Accepting these harms in cases where photographs
feature children is more straightforward because children are not deemed able to
consent, but adults should retain these same dignity-based interests, even after
attaining the capacity to voluntarily engage in nude or sexual photography.

